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A1 Background Information
A1.1 The 2016 property tax campaign
As noted in the paper, random assignment of the 2016 property tax campaign oc-
curred on the neighborhood level. Figure A1 shows a zoomed-in version of neigh-
borhoods in one part of the city, and Figure A7 shows the extent of neighborhoods
across the city. Neighborhood boundaries approximate roads, ravines, and other
landmarks that are easily recognizable from the ground.
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Figure A1: Neighborhoods in Kananga (red indicates treatment)
Tax collectors used tablets and handheld receipt printers. Receipts contained
the unique tax IDs assigned by collectors during property registration (Figure A2).
Only printed receipts were considered valid for the campaign.
Initially, the campaign was meant to include a rental tax, levied on income from
residential renters, as well as the property tax. However, the government subse-
quently dropped the rental tax from the campaign. This decision seemed at first
to be caused by the fact that Hologram Identification Systems’ tablet application
could not support the rental tax. Even after Hologram had fixed this technical issue
(two months into the campaign), though, the government did not change campaign
protocols to include renters. Thus, the 2016 campaign focused exclusively on the
property tax.
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Figure A2: Examples of printed receipts from the property tax campaign.
A1.2 Bribe payment
A natural concern about field-based tax collection is bribery (?). If collectors collect
more bribes than taxes, a door-to-door campaign could fail to be revenue positive; it
could also generate backlash among citizens. Such backlash is an important outcome
in its own right, and would constitute another possible channel through which the
tax campaign might affect participation. However, this section shows that there is
little evidence that the tax campaign increased bribe payment. Indeed, levels of
bribe payment were low across treatment groups.
Two types of collusive bribes are plausible in this context. First, households could
have paid the collector a smaller amount than the tax, b < τ1, where τ1 in this case
is a flat household liability, say 2,000 Congolese Francs (CF). The collector might
have accepted b in exchange for a promise not to enforce the true liability. The
clearest way to measure such bribes is through household self-reports using local
codes for bribes. This type of bribe is typically known as paying the “transport” of
the tax collector, or making an “arrangement.”1 The measure of bribe self reports,
Paid bribe, takes the value of 1 if a participant reported paying a bribe according to
these local codes. I examine the intensive margin using self reports of the amount
1Other local codes for bribes include giving the collector a “coffee,” “tea,” “beer,” and “water.”
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paid, Bribe amount.
Second, ‘midrange’ houses, which face a higher liability, could have paid the
collector τ1+b < τ2, where τ2 here is the flat tax of 6,600 CF.2 In this case, the owner
of a midrange house would have paid the 2,000 CF rate plus a bribe in exchange for
“reclassifying” the house to the lower tax rate. To measure reclassification bribes, a
property tax expert from the provincial tax ministry, who did not conduct field-based
tax collection but who had initially trained all tax collectors, examined photographs
of each house in the sample. Examining each photo on a tablet, one at a time,
he assigned to each the correct rate, without knowledge of what the field-based
collectors assigned (or the identity of the assigned collector). Comparing the two
rates enables me to identify mismatches, in which the household should have paid
6,600 CF but actually paid 2,000 CF. Although it is possible that collectors made
mistakes when classifying households, this is unlikely because (a) the key distinction
between houses that should pay 6,600 CF and 2,000 CF is obvious (based on the
type of building material), and (b) collectors were incentivized to tax households at
the true rate because their bonus was a constant percentage of what they deposited
to the state. Paid bribe equals 1 in such cases of reclassification bribes, as well.3
Measurement error is always a concern when asking about bribes. However,
paying small bribes is not taboo in this context. In another project on bribe payment
at Kananga’s roadway tolls, nearly 50% of participants openly told enumerators
that they bribed the toll officer to avoid paying the full amount (?). Nonetheless,
to assuage concerns about self-reported bribes, I also collected two other measures
of bribes. First, Others bribe is the perceived frequency of bribe payment among
other households on the respondent’s street. Second, Going rate is the respondent’s
estimate of ‘how much would one have to give the tax collector so that he/she will
pass to the next house?’ These bribe measures are inspired by ?.
Table A1 shows the average effects of the tax campaign on bribe payment across
five measures from two different samples. No coherent pattern emerges. When
examining self-reported bribes in the midline or endline data, the treatment effect is
a precisely estimated zero (Columns 1-2). There is a marginally significant decrease
2Midrange houses make up less than 10% of the properties in Kananga.
3Payment of bribes is analogous in control neighborhoods. Households could have paid bribes to
field-based collectors who strayed outside treated neighborhoods, or they could have paid bribes
at the tax ministry (where all control individuals were in principle supposed to have paid the
tax).
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in reported bribe amounts due to the tax campaign. In contrast, the point estimate
is positive and marginally significant when Others bribe is the dependent variable.
Figure A3 reveals that this effect corresponds with 1.5% of respondents in treatment
switching from answering that “none of the people on my street” paid bribes to “a
few of the people on my street” paid bribes. In contrast, the corresponding estimate
when examining the ‘going rate’ of bribes is of tiny magnitude and not statistically
different from zero.
Further evidence comes from considering participants’ self-reported beliefs about
why some people in Kananga did not pay the property tax. Of the seven possible
reasons evaluated by participants, bribe payment was considered the least important
(?), reinforcing the plausibility of the low measured incidence of bribes in this setting.
Table A1: Effects of the campaign on bribe payment
Paid Paid Bribe Others Going
bribe bribe amount bribe rate
(Midline) (Endline) (Endline) (Endline) (Endline)
Campaign -0.001 -0.000 -27.047∗ 0.048∗ 1.903
(0.002) (0.006) (14.054) (0.025) (53.843)
Covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.017 0.015 0.052 0.071
Observations 18141 2913 2913 2046 2566
Clusters 344 356 356 343 356
Control Mean 0.005 0.026 42.149 1.140 712.500
Paid bribe is an indicator for individuals’ self-reported bribe payments using local codes for
bribes. It also equals 1 in the case of ‘reclassification’ bribes. Bribe amount is self reported
amount paid in bribes. Others bribe is a standardized variable increasing in the perceived
frequency that one’s neighbors are paying bribes instead of the property tax. Going rate is
the estimated amount of money that it would take to bribe a tax collector in lieu of paying
the property tax. Data: midline and endline survey.
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Figure A3: Perceptions of the frequency at which other households on the street
paid bribes in place of the property tax (Others bribe).
Some readers familiar with high rates of reported bribe payment in other parts of
the DRC (??), a paradigmatic ‘kleptocracy,’ might be puzzled by this null result and
the low level of bribe payment in general.4 There are several plausible explanations.
First, collectors faced a considerable degree of uncertainty about the government’s
plans to audit their work and pursue sanctions if bribes were found to have been
paid. This uncertainty existed because this was the first-ever citizen tax campaign
in Kananga. Collectors had no precedent on which to base expectations about the
probability of government monitoring and punishment. Moreover, during the cam-
paign, the tax ministry suspended an agent for collecting bribes from firms in place
of the rental tax. Although the agent was unaffiliated with the property tax cam-
paign, this disciplinary action was explicitly highlighted by tax ministry directors
to the collectors working on the 2016 campaign, potentially deterring their future
bribe taking. Finally, the tax campaign represented, in most cases, a one-shot game
between collector and household. But collusive bribery between bureaucrats and
citizens is more likely in repeated games, as when the same collector is responsible
for collecting property taxes in a neighborhood year after year (?).
4I also anticipated an increase in bribe payment, as noted in the pre-analysis plan.
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In light of the negligible impact on bribe payment, I do not consider bribes as a
potential mechanism through which the tax campaign could impact participation,
as discussed in the pre-analysis plan.
A1.3 Kamuina Nsapu militia activity in Kananga
In August 2016, a clash between the national police and a customary chief in Dibaya
territory led to the death of the chief and the beginning of the Kamuina Nsapu militia
movement. Although the group’s demands were triggered by local grievances, very
shortly the Kamuina Nsapu evolved into a broader protest movement against the
national government. In December 2016, President Joseph Kabila did not step
down at the end of his constitutionally mandated term. Protests shook Kinshasa
and many cities across Congo, and the Kamuina Nsapu took up arms. A cycle of
tit-for-tat violence between the army and the Kamuina Nsapu left thousands dead
and hundreds of thousands displaced (?).
These unfortunate events do not affect the internal validity of the research design,
as the randomization nets out any broader trends that affect the city as a whole.
But endline data collection was more difficult as a result. In particular, the research
team could not administer endline surveys in one commune (Nganza), representing
approximately 16% of the city’s total neighborhoods, in which the conflict was most
acute.5 Individuals in this commune could not be sampled or invited to participate
in the endline survey as a result.
The conflict must also inform the interpretation of the external validity of results
concerning attitudes toward the provincial government. Although directives to the
military during the conflict came from the national government, citizens may have
also blamed the provincial government for the conflict that marred the province.
The instability in Kananga would most likely lead causal effects of the tax cam-
paign on participation to be more muted. Because attending a townhall meeting
or submitting a government evaluation required traveling across the city, insecurity
would have effectively made these forms of participation more costly. Indeed, the
government ultimately issued a shelter in place order and so canceled all townhall
meetings after April 1 due to increased violence in Kananga. Although it is difficult
5This commune is home to many migrants from Dibaya, where the Kamuina Nsapu movement
originated. As such, it was the focal point of the conflict in Kananga, even though the majority
of the violence occurred in rural areas outside the city.
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to ascertain precisely how this insecurity interacted with the experiment, it likely
would have suppressed participation throughout the city.
A2 Experimental design and measurement
A2.1 Cross-randomized interventions
This field experiment also included two cross-randomized interventions intended for
a separate paper on bribe payment. First, a citizen information treatment was ran-
domized on the household level in all neighborhoods. This treatment was embedded
in the informational fliers distributed in early 2016 announcing the property tax
campaign. Fliers were distributed to every fifth household in all neighborhoods,
ensuring that a quasi-random set of households spread evenly throughout the city
would receive them.6 Fliers informed citizens that provincial tax collectors were
starting property tax collection and that “they could come to your household for
this reason in the coming months.” They also specified that the money would be
used to “secure the province, to kickstart economic development, and to protect the
wellbeing of the population of Kasaï Central.” In addition to the basic announce-
ment of the campaign, treatment fliers additionally (1) specified the precise tax rates
that households face, and (2) included a photograph of the type of printed receipt
households should receive upon payment. An English translation of the flier text is
as follows, where items 3-5 only appeared on the treatment version.
1. Please take note of the following information.
2. The DGRKOC collectors will start to collect property and rental taxes this
year. They might come to your household for this reason in the following
months.
3. The amount due for the property tax is 2,000 CF, unless you live in a large
house or a multi-storied house. The property tax should be paid only one time
per year. (Treatment only)
4. The amount due for the rental tax is 20% of monthly rent, retained at the
source. The rental tax should be paid each month. (Treatment only)7
6Although I cannot measure precisely which of these households read the fliers, note that about
80% of respondents were able to read in some capacity.
7The campaign initially included the rental tax, but subsequently the government decided to focus
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5. The DGRKOC tax collectors should give you a receipt printed by a portable
printer in front of you. See the example to the right. You have the right to
ask for such a receipt to avoid paying two times. (Treatment only)
6. The money that they collect will support the efforts of the provincial gov-
ernment to secure the province, to kickstart economic development, and to
protect the well being of the population of Kasaï Central.
7. If you have any questions or complaints, please contact 0827316243 or 0974982998.
These are the telephone lines of an independent NGO of scientific researchers
who will transmit your messages to the leaders of the DGRKOC and to the
governor. They will keep your identity confidential.
Second, collectors were informed that half of treated neighborhoods would be
‘audited’ by the tax ministry leadership. Before working in a neighborhood, collec-
tors learned from a list posted at the tax ministry which neighborhoods were to be
audited. The effects of the audit and information interventions on bribe payment
are discussed in detail in a separate paper pooling data from the 2016 tax campaign
with data from subsequent campaigns.
Key baseline covariates were balanced across the relevant treatment and control
groups for these cross-randomized interventions, as shown in the pre-analysis plan.
Additionally, within the endline sample, receipt of the treatment flier is balanced
across individuals in treatment and control (t = −0.91). Table A2 summarizes the
three interventions (the tax campaign, audits, and informational fliers).
Treatment︷ ︸︸ ︷
Audit No Audit Control
Info 65 62 88
No Info 60 66 90
Table A2: Neighborhoods (clusters) in each treatment cell.
A2.2 Endline sampling and probability weights
This section provides more detail about endline sampling. As noted in Section III
in the paper, selection occurred in two steps. First, enumerators conducted a short
exclusively on the property tax, as discussed on p. 3.
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screening survey of roughly 20 property owners per neighborhood. Second, from
those 20 households, 10 were selected and invited to participate.
I conducted a new random sample at endline — rather than tracking baseline
respondents — because (a) I needed a considerably larger sample at endline to be
powered for the survey-based outcomes, and (b) the baseline sample included a large
share of renters, whereas the tax campaign (and thus the endline survey) focused
on property owners. I had included renters in baseline sampling because, as noted,
the tax campaign had initially included renters but ultimately focused on property
owners only (see p. 3). Thus, it was cleanest to take a fresh random sample at
endline for the purposes of studying the effects of the campaign on participation.8
As with the baseline survey, enumerators randomly sampled households for the
screening survey by following a skip pattern until they walked up and down every
street in a neighborhood.9 After enumerators had randomly administered roughly
20 screening surveys, recording basic household attributes and the eligibility of po-
tential participants, I selected a subsample of eligible participants in Stata. First, I
took 4 fully random households from the full set. Second, I selected an additional
6 households per neighborhood based on observed house quality. Assigning higher
probability to higher quality houses (e.g. those built with modern materials other
than mudbricks) focuses on the population most affected by the tax campaign. Tax
collectors differentially targeted higher quality houses, paying them more visits and
collecting more tax from them. Oversampling these houses for the endline survey
means the unweighted estimates concern this targeted population. It also enables
analysis of heterogeneity by house quality, as in the robustness checks shown in
Section A4, and estimation of ‘reclassification bribes’ (Section A1.2).
Specifically, for each screening survey respondent, I calculated a house quality
index based on characteristics of the compound: the roof, walls, the total number of
buildings, and the accessibility to a primary or secondary avenue. The top 6 houses
were selected for endline survey enumeration (the “household quality sample"), along
8In addition, enumerators did track 623 property-owner baseline respondents after the tax cam-
paign to enable analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects on tax compliance based on baseline
beliefs. This is the subject of a companion paper (?).
9If they finished this exercise but had not yet reached the target of 20 screening surveys, they were
instructed to choose a different path through the neighborhood orthogonal to the previous path
and continue sampling. If they reached 20 before they had walked down all neighborhood streets,
they continued until they reached the end, exceeding the target number of surveys.
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with the 4 random draws (the “endline random sample”). The result of this procedure
is a slightly higher proportion of relatively higher quality houses in the endline
sample. Figure A4 demonstrates this shift graphically: the endline sample is slightly
to the right of the full screening survey sample in terms of estimated house quality.
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
De
ns
ity
-4 -2 0 2 4
House	quality
Endline	sample
Full	(screening	survey)	sample
DistribuCon	of	house	quality
Figure A4: Densities of estimated house quality for the endline sample and the
full screening survey sample.
Because of this sampling process, the (unweighted) estimates reported in the pa-
per are not representative of the full population of Kananga, but rather of a slightly
better-off sub-population of the city that was more targeted by the tax campaign.
For completeness, in robustness tables in Section A4, I include specifications with
probability weights to make estimates fully representative of Kananga’s population.
I construct weights as follows. First, for each individual i with house quality x
in neighborhood j, I estimate a weight, wwithinij , to adjust for the higher selection
probability for relatively high quality houses:
wwithinij =
fpopj (xi)
f sampj (xi)
(1)
where fpopj ∼ N(µ
pop
j , σ
pop
j ), f
samp
j ∼ N(µ
samp
j , σ
samp
j ), and the µj’s and σj’s reflect
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neighborhood-level empirical means and standard deviations, respectively.10 Second,
I construct a between-neighborhood weight to account for the fact that the number
of individuals in the endline sample is (roughly) constant across neighborhoods, but
neighborhoods themselves have different numbers of property owners. This weight
is simply:
wbetweenj =
nscreeningj /N
nendlinej /n
(2)
where N is the total number of property owners in Kananga, and n is the total num-
ber of property owners in the endline sample. The two weights are then multiplied
together and normalized to generate a probability weight that is used in regres-
sions in Section A4. Figure A5 shows the distributions of the ultimate weights.
As expected, individuals in the “endline random sample” receive the most weight
because they are on average of lower house quality and thus underrepresented in
the endline sample. By contrast, the “household quality sample” receives the least
weight because these high-house-quality respondents are overrepresented in the end-
line sample. Using these weights in the main analyses does not substantially alter
the results.
10I tried using the empirical densities rather than relying on parametric assumptions, but the
resulting weights had large numbers of extreme values. Imposing a normal distribution on
neighborhood-level house quality is justified by the empirical distributions of house quality taken
in the full endline and screening survey samples (Figure A4).
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A2.3 Townhall meetings and government evaluations
Townhall invitations were distributed evenly in treatment and control neighbor-
hoods. All endline respondents received invitations.11 Figure A6 shows a sample
invitation in French.12 In addition to receiving the invitation, citizens were read the
following verbal prompt: “The meeting will be an opportunity to obtain information
about taxation and public spending in Kananga and to ask questions to officials in
the provincial government of Kasaï Central.”
Invitation  
	
	
Cette invitation est individuelle et nominative, elle ne peut être donnée à un tiers. 
 
Vous êtes convié(e) à une réunion d’information portant sur les impôts de la 
Province en présence de certains membres du Gouvernement Provincial du 
Kasaï Central.  
Cette réunion aura lieu le 20 février 2017 à 10h00 dans la Salle de Plénière à 
l’Assemblée Provinciale. Pour le bon déroulement de cette réunion veuillez 
venir au plus tard à 9h00.  
 
Code à présenter à l’entrée : ……………………… 
 
Sans cette présente invitation, l’entrée dans la Salle de Plénière sera impossible. Il ne 
faut donc pas oublier de prendre cette invitation avec vous. 
Figure A6: Invitation to townhall meeting held at Kananga’s Provincial Assembly
building on February 20, 2017.
11The exception, as noted in the paper, is respondents sampled after April 1, when the provincial
government discontinued the meetings due to insecurity in Kananga.
12In English: “You are invited to a meeting about provincial taxation in the presence of certain
members of the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central. This meeting will take place on the
[DATE] at 10h00 in the Plenary Room of the Provincial Assembly. To ensure the meeting goes
smoothly, please arrive by 9h00. Code to present at the entry: [CODE]. Without this invitation,
entry to the Plenary Room will not be possible. So please don’t forget to bring this invitation
with you.”
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Figure A7: Locations of provincial assembly building (townhall meeting location)
and evaluation form drop box in downtown Kananga.
Townhall meetings took place in the provincial assembly building, shown in Fig-
ure A8. The location of the building is shown on the map in Figure A7 in the paper.
Individuals deposited their invitations when they arrived, allowing the research team
to link participation to household surveys with the unique ID code (unknown to the
government). During each meeting, the finance minister and tax ministry director
made short introductions, and then the majority of time was devoted to question
and answer. The average meeting lasted just over three hours. The atmosphere
was formal but confrontational and often tense. Citizens expressed strong dissat-
isfaction with the quality of the government and demanded better services, more
transparency, and more ways to have a voice in politics if they were expected to
pay taxes. Evidence about the types of comments citizens made during townhalls is
summarized in Section A3.3.3. The topics of citizens’ comments were recorded by
16
enumerators in the back of the room.13
Figure A8: Left Panel—Provincial Assembly building in Kananga, the location of
the townhall meetings (Photo credit: CAID 2016). Right Panel—Townhall meeting
on January 30, 2017
Government evaluations were also distributed equally in treatment and control.
Endline survey respondents became eligible to receive them after they had finished
the survey. They were read the following script concerning the evaluations: “Here
is an evaluation form that you can send to the provincial government. The form
asks for your opinions about the work of the provincial government. It is your
decision whether or not you want to deliver it in a locked box in Biancky [downtown
Kananga]. It will be completely anonymous: that’s to say, if you choose to deliver it,
the provincial government will never know your identity based on the information
on the card. However, an anonymous summary of the information on the card
and the cards themselves will be provided to the governor and other officials in the
government so they know about your opinions and suggestions.” The drop box was
located in downtown Kananga (Figure A9). As promised, the governor ultimately
received the evaluation forms along with a report summarizing their contents and
containing a typed list of all written-in suggestions. The finance minister and head
of the tax ministry also received copies. A summary of the evaluations submitted
by citizens appears in Section A3.3.3.
13Options on the tablet included: “the property tax / 2016 campaign, provincial taxation in
general, the use of tax money in the provincial government / provincial budget, the use of tax
money in the national government / national budget, corruption in the provincial government,
corruption in the national government, public goods / infrastructure in Kananga (road quality,
schools, etc), security in Kananga (militia, etc), politics in Kinshasa (Kabila, the accord, PM
Badibanga), other.” When enumerators chose other, they were prompted to write in the topic.
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Figure A9: Left Panel—Example of government evaluation form. Right Panel—
Evaluation form drop box in downtown Kananga
The full text of the questions on the evaluation form, inspired by (?), is as follows:
First, please choose which of the following options you agree with most:
1. I am satisfied with the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central and
have no changes to suggest about its operations.
2. I want the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central to do a better
job.
Now please indicate if you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly
disagree with the following propositions.
1. The Provincial Government of Kasaï Central should provide more
opportunities for public participation in its decisions.
2. The Provincial Government of Kasaï Central should provide more
access to information about its programs.
3. The Provincial Government of Kasaï Central should spend more
18
money on public goods and development and less money on admin-
istration.
4. The Provincial Government of Kasaï Central should create a place
in town where I can report problems with public services.
Comments:
A3 Additional tables and figures for the paper
A3.1 Main results (Section V)
This section contains additional figures and tables referenced in the text of Section
V in the paper (except for the main robustness checks, which appear in Section A4).
Collector visits, taxpayer registration, and payment
This section examines the effects on tax compliance (a) in the endline sample only,
and (b) using an alternate measure of property tax payment. Specifically, Table A3
shows estimated treatment effects restricted to the endline sample. The magnitude
of the estimated increase in tax payment (Columns 1-2) is analogous to that esti-
mated among the universe of potential taxpayers, as reported in Table III in the
paper.
Next the table considers an alternative measure of tax compliance in the endline
sample. This robustness exercise is motivated by the fact that the primary measure
of compliance also matches on taxpayer IDs — in addition to name matches and
possession of valid receipts — but these IDs do not exist in control. There is thus an
asymmetry in measurement for the primary household-level tax compliance outcome.
Importantly, the neighborhood-level measure of tax compliance addresses this issue
by eliminating the need to merge administrative tax records and household surveys
(Table III, Column 4). Reassuringly, the neighborhood- and household-level tax
compliance estimates are very similar.
However, for completeness, I also investigate this measurement issue in the endline
sample only. Specifically, I consider an alternative household-level measure that
takes a value of 1 only if (i) there is a name match between administrative tax data
and survey data, or (ii) a household presents the enumerator with a valid receipt
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— the second two conditions of the primary measure. When using this alternative
measure of compliance, the magnitude of the treatment effect shrinks from 10.8 to
7.8 percentage points. This decrease likely reflects the fact that the measurement
error from name matching causes more downward bias in the estimate of compliance
in treatment than it does in control — because control compliance is so low that
there are effectively floor effects on the bias induced by measurement error. The
logic behind this assertion is as follows.
First, measurement error associated with relying only on name matching and
possession of receipts likely causes downward bias on estimated compliance. For the
receipt-based condition, households could only lose receipts, leading to underesti-
mation of tax compliance.14 Similarly, for name matching, measurement error likely
biases estimated compliance to zero. This is because married couples in Congo do
not share last names (or any names) and nicknames are common. There are thus
likely to be ‘false negatives’ after matching government tax records and survey data.
On the other hand, ‘false positives’ are possible but less likely given that Stata’s
reclink function uses a threshold of 0.6 for string matches, and these name matches
are conditioned on perfect neighborhood matches. Since neighborhoods contain only
130 compounds on average, it is unlikely that there are many false positives from the
matching procedure. On net, then, the receipt-based and name-matching measure
likely underestimates the number of payers in treatment and control.
Second, such under-reporting likely causes downward bias on the estimated treat-
ment effect because the rate of compliance cannot go much lower in control. There is
essentially a floor on the ability of this measurement error-induced bias to reduce the
estimated compliance rate in control. We can be confident that so few households in
control paid because in the administrative data, there are only 4 records of property
tax payments from control neighborhoods after the randomization of neighborhoods
into treatment and control for the 2016 door-to-door campaign started.15
In sum, the combination of (a) verifiably low levels of compliance outside of
14Households could not find or repurpose receipts because enumerators validated receipts using
the name and neighborhood number printed on them. Handwritten receipts were not accepted.
15Before the campaign, there are 190 records of property tax payments, 90% of which concerned
commercial properties, whereas the campaign focused on residential properties. If one wanted
to include these commercial payments in estimates of the campaign’s impact on compliance and
revenues, they would likely be balanced across treatment and control because they were made
before the randomization. Thus, the maximum compliance rate would still be less than 1% in
control neighborhoods.
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the campaign, and (b) the fact that receipt possession and name matching likely
underestimate actual tax compliance together implies that this alternative estimate
of the treatment effect is downward biased.
Table A3: Effects on tax compliance in endline sample only and using alternative
measure of tax payment
Property tax compliance
(primary measure) (alternative measure)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Campaign 0.108∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Covariates No Yes No Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.070 0.084 0.062 0.075
Observations 2913 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Property tax compliance indicates property tax payment. Columns 1-2 use the primary measure
examined in the paper, e.g. Section IV.B in the paper. Columns 3-4 consider an alternative measure
that takes a value of 1 only if (i) there is a name match between administrative tax data and survey
data, or (ii) a household presents the enumerator with a valid receipt. It does not, therefore, rely on
matching by tax ID, which is only possible in the treatment group. All columns consider estimations
conducted in the endline sample only. Data: endline survey merged with government tax database.
Political participation
This section contains several additional exhibits relevant to the main results about
political participation. What follows is a summary of these tables and figures.
• Table A4 demonstrates that the main results on participation are unaffected
when controlling for the distance between households and the venues of par-
ticipation.
• Table A5 shows that the main treatment effects are robust to including on the
righthand side: the three imbalanced covariates mentioned in Section IV.D in
the paper (business owner status, wealth, and the quality of public lighting in
the neighborhood at baseline) plus their interactions with treatment. Although
the standard errors are larger, the coefficients’ magnitude changes little.
• Table A6 explores whether the tax campaign impacted attitudes about politics
or participation at the national or local level. I lack measures of costly engage-
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ment at these levels of government, so I consider survey evidence. The outcome
in the first column, Role of citizens in politics, is an index increasing in views
about the importance of citizen monitoring of the government. The second
column examines effects on general Interest in politics, which combines sur-
vey questions about political news consumption, knowledge, and demand for
information about the government. The third column examines self-reported
Engagement with national politics, including current and future participation
in national elections, parties, marches, protests, and rallies. The fourth column
examines engagement at the local level with city chiefs. These local leaders
have two main responsibilities: (1) organizing weekly salongo, an informal tax
in which citizens contribute labor toward local public goods, such as maintain-
ing neighborhood roads (?); (2) mediating local disputes to avoid escalation to
the formal court system. Column 5 examines trust in and evaluations of city
chiefs. Column 6 examines demand for formalization, measured as citizens’
self-reported recent efforts to obtain identity documents, business licenses, and
land titles. As always, detailed variable descriptions are located in Section A5.
Reassuringly, treated respondents reported stronger views about the im-
portance of citizens (and their representatives) monitoring the government.
They did not report higher overall interest in politics, nor did they report
more participation at a national level.16 Interestingly, individuals in treat-
ment did report engaging less with local city chiefs. Figure A25 shows the
effects on the underlying survey questions, revealing in particular that treated
individuals reported consulting less with their avenue chief and engaging less
in the local labor tax, Salongo. Citizens in treatment also did not indicate
higher demand for formal documents compared to citizens in control.
• Figure A10 shows the percentage of households that either attended a townhall
or submitted an evaluation by neighborhood, separately in treatment and
control.
• Figure A11 shows the distribution of the time gap between tax collection and
outcome measurement. This time gap is analyzed in Figure I of the paper.
• Table A7 estimates heterogeneous impacts of the tax campaign on costly par-
16Figure A24 is a coefficient plot showing results for the individual survey questions.
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ticipation by a series of moderators pre-specified in the analysis plan.17 The
treatment effect appears slightly more pronounced in neighborhoods with bet-
ter infrastructure (roads, public lighting). It also appears more pronounced
among individuals (i) from the ethnic majority, (ii) who believe the campaign
raised compliance considerably, and (iii) who have more overall knowledge of
the tax campaign. By contrast, there is little evidence of heterogeneity by
self-reported trust in foreign researchers or knowledge of other taxpayers.
Table A4: Effects of the campaign on participation controlling for distance from
respondents’ households to the participation venues
Townhall Evaluation Townhall Townhall Index
meeting form or and (townhall &
attendance submission evaluation evaluation evaluation)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Campaign 0.045∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.012) (0.016) (0.009) (0.043)
Distance to townhall -0.007
(0.014)
Distance to dropbox -0.016∗∗
(0.008)
Distance to townhall -0.018 0.008 -0.019
& dropbox (avg.) (0.011) (0.006) (0.028)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.068 0.056 0.072 0.040 0.074
Observations 1934 2913 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 252 356 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.171 0.171 0.164 0.035 -0.077
The outcome variables are analogous to those examined in Columns 1-5 of Table IV in the paper. The
three Distance variables are the Euclidean distance from respondents’ households to the townhall venue
(Provincial Assembly building), the evaluation drop box, or to both locations (averaged), respectively.
As shown in Figure A7 in the paper, these locations are only 1 kilometer apart in downtown Kananga.
Using the average distance is easiest to interpret when examining the outcomes in Columns 3-5,
especially considering that all estimations include stratum fixed effects. Data: endline survey merged
with participation records and geographic estimates.
17The moderators considered in Columns 4-7 are outcomes of treatment, and thus these analyses
must be interpreted with caution.
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Table A5: Effects of the campaign on participation controlling for imbalanced covariates & interactions with treatment
Townhall Evaluation Townhall Townhall Index Cost of Cost of
meeting form or and (townhall & participation participation
attendance submission evaluation evaluation evaluation) (transport) (transport & opp.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Campaign 0.041 0.022 0.050∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.012) (0.055) (0.023) (0.029)
Camp. X Bus. -0.030 -0.010 -0.027 -0.014 -0.078 -0.081∗∗ -0.091∗∗
(0.039) (0.025) (0.033) (0.016) (0.080) (0.033) (0.042)
Camp. X Wealth -0.005 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.021 -0.006 -0.005
(0.021) (0.013) (0.016) (0.009) (0.040) (0.015) (0.020)
Camp. X Light 0.115 0.033 0.045 0.032 0.146 -0.025 -0.019
(0.099) (0.067) (0.079) (0.042) (0.204) (0.059) (0.082)
Business owner -0.016 -0.011 -0.000 -0.005 -0.009 0.029 0.030
(0.030) (0.019) (0.025) (0.011) (0.060) (0.025) (0.031)
Wealth 0.021 0.019∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.000 0.060∗ 0.011 0.026∗
(0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.032) (0.010) (0.014)
Pub. light qual. -0.134 -0.007 -0.094∗ -0.037 -0.246∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.152∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.039) (0.051) (0.027) (0.133) (0.041) (0.056)
Basic Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.069 0.055 0.071 0.040 0.074 0.056 0.060
Observations 1934 2913 2913 2913 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 252 356 356 356 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.17 0.099 0.16 0.035 -0.077 0.11 0.16
The dependent variables are the same as those in Table IV. Controls include the three imbalanced covariates noted in paper Section II (business
owner status, wealth, and the quality of public lighting in the neighborhood at baseline) as well as interactions with treatment. Data: endline
survey merged with participation records.
24
Table A6: Effects of the campaign on political attitudes and participation at other
levels of government
Role of Interest Engagement Engagement Views Demand
citizens in in national with of for
in politics politics politics city chiefs city chiefs formalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Campaign 0.086∗∗ 0.013 0.025 -0.112∗∗ -0.053 0.002
(0.042) (0.036) (0.040) (0.046) (0.048) (0.037)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.064 0.269 0.069 0.092 0.067 0.085
Observations 2875 2913 2913 2820 2820 2913
Clusters 356 356 356 356 356 356
Control Mean -0.033 0.18 -0.015 0.022 -0.0007 0.014
Role of citizens in politics is a standardized index increasing in attitudes that citizens and their representatives should
actively monitor the government. Interest in politics is a standardized index increasing in revealed and self-reported
interest in politics. Engagement with national politics is a standardized index increasing in self-reported participation
in national politics. Engagement with city chiefs is a standardized index increasing in the self-reported interactions
with and knowledge of avenue chiefs. Views of city chiefs is a standardized index increasing in self-reported trust
in and evaluations of avenue chiefs. Demand for formalization is a standardized index increasing in self-reported
recent efforts to obtain identity documents, business licenses, and land titles. Columns 4-5 exclude respondents who
are themselves chiefs. See Section A5 for more information about the underlying survey questions in each of these
indices. Data: endline survey.
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Figure A10: Neighborhood-level participation rates (% of HHs that attended a
townhall or submitted an evaluation) across Kananga.
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Figure A11: Distribution of the gap in time between the tax campaign and
outcome measurement.
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Table A7: Heterogeneous treatment effects of the campaign on participation by
moderators pre-specified in analysis plan
Townhall or evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Campaign 0.026 0.024 0.018 0.048∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗ 0.034 0.011
(0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.019)
Camp X Road quality 0.051
(0.034)
Road quality (high) -0.021
(0.025)
Camp X Public lighting 0.055∗
(0.033)
Public lighting (high) -0.002
(0.031)
Camp X Majority ethnicity 0.043
(0.032)
Majority ethnicity -0.003
(0.025)
Camp X Trust researchers 0.019
(0.059)
Trust researchers 0.006
(0.044)
Camp X Know payers -0.040
(0.068)
Know payers 0.049
(0.059)
Camp X Perceived compliance 0.031
(0.031)
Perceived compliance (high) -0.023
(0.023)
Camp X Knowledge campaign 0.068∗∗
(0.030)
Knowledge of campaign (high) 0.010
(0.022)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.071 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.073 0.071 0.076
Observations 2913 2913 2913 2913 2849 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356 356 356 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164 0.164
F -test p-value 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.009
The table reports heterogeneous treatment effects of the tax campaign on costly participation by a series of moderators
enumeratored in the analysis plan. The dependent variable is an indicator for attending a townhall or submitting an
evaluation, the same as in Column 3 of Table IV. The first two moderators, Road quality and Public lighting, come from
baseline data; the rest from endline data. All moderators are included as dummy variables, where for continuous variables
— all except majority ethnicity and knowledge of taxpayers — the regressors indicate above-median values of the variable.
Data: endline survey merged with participation records and baseline public goods measures.27
Beliefs about the government
This section contains the following exhibits concerning beliefs about the government.
• Table A8 probes further the extent to which the tax campaign caused citi-
zens to update their beliefs about the provincial government’s responsibility
in public goods provision. The first column examines the outcome Resp. for
public goods provision, replicating the result reported in Table V, while the
second and third column report results disaggregated by the subindices dis-
cussed in Section IV.B in the paper. The fourth column then examines citizens’
perceptions of the current level of public goods provision from the provincial
government.
• Figure A12 compares: (1) beliefs about the responsibility of the provincial
government to provide public goods across a range of sectors (Resp. for pub-
lic goods provision); (2) beliefs about how the revenue from the property tax
campaign would actually be spent by the government (Expected spending from
taxes); and (3) beliefs about the amount of public goods the provincial gov-
ernment was already providing in each sector (Actual public goods provision).
All data come from the endline survey. Most citizens expected spending on
infrastructure, consistent with government messaging that campaign revenues
would be used to “promote economic development” (from tax collectors and
on pre-campaign fliers). Although infrastructure was among citizens’ spend-
ing priorities, they also demanded non-trivial levels of public goods provision
from the provincial government across each of these sectors. In particular,
there appears to have been a gap between the demand for provincial govern-
ment spending on security and expectations about spending of property tax
revenues. The demand for security likely reflects the Kamuina Nsapu conflict
that was ongoing at the time of endline administration (see Section A1.3).
• Figure A13 then examines the accuracy of citizens’ perceptions about the level
of compliance with the property tax. In the treatment group, the modal citizen
accurately predicted how many people were paying the tax.
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Table A8: Effects of the campaign on the perceived responsibility for public goods
provision: analysis of sub-indices and beliefs about current levels of provision
Resp. for public goods provision Current public
(Full index) (Sector questions) (Hypotheticals) goods provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Campaign 0.117∗∗ 0.088∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.037
(0.051) (0.053) (0.041) (0.045)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.041 0.043 0.028 0.048
Observations 2913 2813 2900 2910
Clusters 356 356 356 356
Control Mean -0.063 -0.044 -0.06 -0.042
Resp. for public goods provision (Full index) is a standardized index increasing in the perceived
responsibility of the provincial government in public goods provision. It is composed of the following
two variables. Resp. for public goods provision (Sector questions) is composed only of questions
asking the respondent who should provide a series of public goods. Resp. for public goods provision
(Hypotheticals) is composed of questions asking the respondent to choose between viewpoints, one
of which espouses the provincial government play a more active role in service provision. Current
public goods provision is a standardized index increasing in citizens’ perceptions of the current level
of public goods provision by the provincial government. See p. 62 for the exact survey questions.
Data: endline survey.
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Figure A12: Beliefs about the government’s responsibility for public goods provi-
sion, actual level of public goods provision, and expected spending from the property
tax campaign revenues.
Notes: Resp. for public goods provision (left axis) is the share of endline survey respondents who
said the provincial government should be principally responsible for providing the indicated public
good. Expected spending from taxes (left axis) is the share of endline survey respondents who indi-
cated that property tax revenues were likely to be spent in the indicated sector. Each respondent
selected the two sectors in which they thought property tax spending was most likely, including
waste/leakage and administration. Actual public goods provision (right axis) is the average current
level of public goods provision perceived by endline survey respondents, where 0 indicates no pro-
vision, 1 indicates some provision, and 2 indicates a high degree of provision. The survey questions
constituting Resp. for public goods provision and Actual public goods provision did not ask about
administrative costs or waste/leakage, hence the missing data for those categories. Data: endline
survey.
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A3.2 Alternative explanations (Section V.C)
This section contains additional tables and figures referenced in Section V.C of the
paper, concerning possible alternative explanations for the reduced-form effect of
the tax campaign on participation. The exhibits are as follows:
• Table A9 shows that, across a range of measures discussed in Section V.C in
the paper, there do not appear to be differences in the trust in or familiarity
with the research team across treatment and control.
• Table A10 examines if flier recipients in control were less likely to partici-
pate than non-recipients. Such a decrease would be consistent with a “disap-
pointment effect” hypothesis in which flier recipients in control received a net
negative signal (because they expected tax collectors who never came) and
lowered their participation. Fliers were distributed quasi-randomly following
a skip pattern of “every fifth house” through all neighborhoods of Kananga.
As a validation that flier recipients in control indeed learned more about the
property tax and collection campaign, the first column of Table A10 sum-
marizes a regression of knowledge about provincial taxation on an indicator
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for flier recipients (restricting the sample to the control group). Receiving
a flier increases knowledge of taxation by 0.86 standard deviations.18 The
second column then shows that flier recipients and non-recipients in control
appear to participate at similar rates. The third column then re-estimates the
main results on participation excluding the households in the control group
that received informational fliers. If the treatment effect were explained by
individuals in control reducing their participation because they expected to
receive tax collectors but never did (at least before outcome collection), then
we would expect this reduction to be concentrated among those who received
informational fliers in control. Thus, excluding control flier receivers would
reduce the estimated treatment effect of the campaign. However, there is no
such reduction.
• Table A11 offers an alternative test of the ‘disappointment effect” hypothesis.
It shows that, among the 229 individuals in control who were tracked from
baseline to endline, views of the provincial government do not appear to have
deteriorated over the course of the experiment. This observation reinforces
that the treatment effect is unlikely to be explained by declining participation
in control rather than increasing participation in treatment.
• Figure A14 shows that there is not an increase in participation (Townhall
or evaluation) among households in treated neighborhoods close to a border
with a control neighborhood, as one would have expected if awareness of the
untaxed control was driving participation.
18The outcome variable is an index of five indicator variables capturing citizens’ knowledge of the
property tax, tax rate, tax campaign, tax ministry, and the type of receipt for payers of the
property tax. Although two of these questions are self-reported and essentially trusting the word
of the respondent, three of them are verifiable (and the coding of the variables, as indicated
above, captures whether the respondent gave the correct or incorrect answer). Examining each
of these questions as separate outcomes yields similar results to the index.
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Table A9: Effects of the campaign on trust in and familiarity with the research
team
Trusts Knows Past No Fake
researchers researchers Participant phone phone
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Campaign 0.056 -0.037 0.021 0.022 -0.014
(0.051) (0.048) (0.037) (0.019) (0.017)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.036 0.121 0.016 0.123 0.038
Observations 2733 2913 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356 356 356 356
Control Mean -0.037 0.041 -0.020 0.176 0.077
Trusts researchers is a standardized measure of respondents’ self-reported trust levels in
foreign research organizations. Knows researchers indicates respondents who could identify
the employer of the enumerator in the endline survey. Past participant indicates respondents
who self-reported participation in past research activities conducted by our team in Kananga.
No phone indicates that the respondent did not provide a phone number in the endline
survey. Fake phone indicates that the respondent provided a bad or fake phone number.
Data: endline survey.
Table A10: Informational fliers about tax campaign and participation
Dependent variable Knowledge of Townhall or
provincial taxation evaluation
Sample Control Control Full sample
(1) (2) (3)
Flier recipient 0.862∗∗∗ -0.005
(0.073) (0.030)
Campaign 0.049∗∗∗
(0.017)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.161 0.067 0.071
Observations 1210 1210 2778
Clusters 145 145 356
Control Mean -0.3 0.16 0.16
The dependent variable in Column 1 is a standardized index of five survey questions gauging respon-
dents’ knowledge of the property tax, tax rate, tax campaign, tax ministry, and the type of receipt
for payers of the property tax. The dependent variable in Columns 2-3 indicates attendance at a
townhall or submission of an evaluation. The sample in Columns 1-2 is the control group. Column
3 examines the full sample excluding flier recipients in control. Data: endline survey merged with
participation records.
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Table A11: Within-individual changes in views of the provincial government from
baseline to endline
Performance Trust Integrity of Resp. for
of in government public goods
government government spending provision
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Endline 0.020 0.001 0.025 -0.126
(0.100) (0.089) (0.092) (0.090)
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 409 450 448 454
Clusters 119 120 120 120
Control Mean -0.021 0.011 0.007 0.019
Performance of government is the respondent’s evaluation of the provincial government.
Trust in government is self-reported trust in the provincial government. Integrity of gov-
ernment spending is the share of tax money respondents expect to be spent well rather than
being wasted or stolen. Resp. for public goods provision is increasing in the perception that
the provincial government should be a primary provider of public goods in Kananga. These
outcomes are observed twice for a subsample of baseline participants who were found and
re-surveyed after the tax campaign. The sample examined in the table is the 229 of these
individuals in the control group. Endline indicates data collected during the endline survey
(after the tax campaign). All regressions include individual fixed effects, so the analysis
concerns changes from baseline to endline within individuals. Data: repeat baseline sample,
discussed and analyzed primarily in (?).
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Figure A14: Participation (Townhall or evaluation) in treatment neighborhoods
as a function of distance to control.
A3.3 Mechanisms (Section VI)
This section contains supplementary tables and figures referenced in Section VI of
the paper, examining each of the possible mechanisms in turn.
A3.3.1 Entitlement
The first possible mechanism is entitlement, in which the increase in participation
is driven by taxpayers who expect reciprocal benefits or experience an endowment
effect after paying. The additional exhibits here include the following.
• Table A12 examines coefficient stability in a regression of participation on
payment in treatment neighborhoods while sequentially adding controls. Con-
trolling for observables causes the correlation coefficient on the payment indi-
cator to decrease from a magnitude of 0.046 with no controls to a magnitude
of -0.004 with a large set of controls.
• Figure A15 plots the needed amount of negative selection on unobservables
that would be needed to justify different hypothetical magnitudes of a causal
effect of payment on participation. That is, despite the instability of the
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correlation coefficient on the payment indicator in Table A12, I examine what
amount of selection on unobservables in the opposite direction would be neces-
sary for there to be a true causal effect of payment on participation, following
(?). This type of selection would require unobservables that are positively
correlated with payment but negatively correlated with participation. For in-
stance, unobservable traits in which individuals have high ability to pay and
also high opportunity costs of participation could generate this type of selec-
tion.19 Figure A15 reveals that there would need to be selection on unobserv-
ables of -0.16 for there to be a true causal effect of payment on participation
with magnitude of 0.05, i.e. a 5 percentage-point difference between payers
and non-payers, which is approximately what the no-controls specification in
Column 1 of Table A12 implies. This estimate implies a large degree of needed
selection, and it increases substantially if we assume larger causal effects of
payment. In light of evidence from observables suggesting that most forms of
selection appear to push in the opposite direction, these high rates of negative
selection on unobservables reinforce the other evidence in the paper that there
is not a positive relationship between payment and participation, as one would
expect in an entitlement mechanism.
• Figure A16 plots, for each tax collector who worked on the campaign, the cor-
relation between visits and payment, conditional on household covariates and
stratum fixed effects. Despite the fact that collecting tax payments was impos-
sible without visiting households (and thus the correlation cannot be negative),
the largest correlation coefficient is 0.13, and for only a fifth of collectors is
the correlation coefficient statistically different from zero. This considerable
variation in the observed effort (visits) and effectiveness (payment) of tax col-
lectors is reassuring for the IV strategy used in Section VI of the paper. Some
neighborhoods are randomly assigned to a set of collectors likely to exert high
effort; others are assigned to collectors likely to demonstrate high effectiveness.
• Table A13 shows the first stage regressions for the IV strategy.
• Table A14 offers a check of the identifying assumption behind the JIVE strat-
egy by examining the correlation between these instruments and refusals in
the midline survey in treatment neighborhoods. The logic is that, if there are
19For what it’s worth, Table A12 does not contain empirical patterns that support this intuition
from observable proxies (i.e. different proxies of employment and income).
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aspects of these underlying collector traits that impact participation through
channels other than registration or payment, then that would be reflected in
respondents’ openness to complete the midline questionnaire, which occurred
shortly after the tax campaign with all property owners. Table A14 reveals
no statistically significant correlations between the JIVE instrument for pay-
ment propensity (or for registration propensity) and the probability of midline
respondents’ not completing the survey.
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Figure A15: Needed selection on unobservables to account for positive causal
effects of payment on participation.
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Table A12: Coefficient stability analysis of the correlation between payment and
participation in treatment neighborhoods
Townhall or evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Property tax compliance 0.046 0.019 0.014 -0.004
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
Age 0.012∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age squared -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗ -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.142∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025)
Monthly income (log) 0.018 0.006
(0.022) (0.022)
Household wealth index -0.002 0.002
(0.011) (0.012)
Quality of public lighting -0.060 -0.070
(0.071) (0.071)
Education (years) 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Unemployed 0.027 0.030
(0.021) (0.022)
Owns business of any size -0.016 -0.012
(0.023) (0.024)
Government worker 0.064 0.069∗
(0.039) (0.042)
Born in Kananga -0.008 -0.010
(0.022) (0.022)
Majority ethnicity 0.038∗ 0.035
(0.022) (0.022)
Integrity of govt. spending -0.011
(0.010)
Stratum FE No Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.001 0.076 0.097 0.100
Observations 1703 1703 1699 1596
Clusters 211 211 211 211
Dep. Var. Mean 0.208 0.208 0.208 0.208
Townhall or evaluation indicates participation in a townhall or submission of an evaluation. Property
tax compliance indicates property tax payment validated in the admin data, as described in Section
IV.B in the paper. Other independent variables are considered in Table II. Data: endline survey
merged with government tax database and participation records. The sample is restricted to treated
neighborhoods. Sample size decreases in columns 3-4 because of non-response to certain survey
questions introduced as controls.
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Figure A16: Plotted correlation coefficients (and 95% CIs) between visits and tax
compliance for individual tax collectors.
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Table A13: IV - First stage: Predicting registration and tax payment using ran-
domly assigned tax collector propensities (JIVE instruments) and double collector
bonuses
Dependent variable Registered as taxpayer Property tax compliance
Sample All HHs in treatment Registered HHs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Registration propensity 0.266∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.079) (0.081)
Payment propensity 0.115∗∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.233∗∗ 0.230∗∗
(0.055) (0.059) (0.094) (0.099)
Double collector bonus 0.340∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.078∗∗ -0.010 0.018
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038) (0.037)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enum FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1703 1703 1703 1703 938 938
Clusters 211 211 211 211 210 210
Dep. Var. Mean 0.551 0.551 0.116 0.116 0.210 0.210
F -stat 64.216 55.688 4.241 5.281 3.195 2.753
Registered as taxpayer is an indicator for households registered with tax IDs. Property tax compliance is
an indicator for households who paid the property tax. Registration propensity is a leave-one-out (JIVE)
estimator that uses randomly assigned tax collectors’ observed registration rates in other neighborhoods
to predict the probability of households being registered as taxpayers in a given neighborhood. Payment
propensity is constructed with the same procedure using instead tax collectors’ observed payment rates in
other neighborhoods to predict the payment rate in a given neighborhood. Double collector bonus is an
indicator for households randomly assigned to be eligible for a double collector bonus. See Section VI.A in
the paper for details about these instruments. Data: endline survey merged with government tax database.
The sample in all columns includes only the treatment group. Columns 5-6 further restrict the sample to
registered households in treatment.
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Table A14: Correlation between JIVE instruments and respondent refusals in
midline survey in treatment neighborhoods
Respondent refusals
in midline survey
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Payment propensity -0.045 -0.012
(0.042) (0.038)
Registration propensity -0.014 -0.021
(0.036) (0.032)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Enumerator FE No Yes No Yes
R2 0.358 0.517 0.355 0.517
Observations 1703 1703 1703 1703
Clusters 211 211 211 211
Dep. Var. Mean 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.090
Respondent refusals in midline survey is an indicator for midline survey respondents who did not
complete the questionnaire. Registration propensity is a leave-one-out (JIVE) estimator that uses
randomly assigned tax collectors’ observed registration rates in other neighborhoods to predict the
probability of households being registered as taxpayers in a given neighborhood. Payment propensity
is constructed with the same procedure using instead tax collectors’ observed payment rates in other
neighborhoods to predict the payment rate in a given neighborhood. See Section VI.A in the paper
for details about these instruments. Data: endline survey merged with midline neighborhood-level
estimates of survey refusals and non-response. The sample is restricted to treatment neighborhoods
only.
A3.3.2 Updating
The second possible mechanism is updating. This section first sketches a simple
decision-theoretical framework for the updating mechanism, which has received less
attention in the literature. Imagine there is a government and one citizen who is
uncertain about the capacity of the government. The government sets a policy
g(θ, λ), which is a deterministic function of the government’s capacity, θ ∈ {H,L},
and the citizen’s decision to monitor the government, λ ∈ {1, 0}. The citizen incurs
a cost c to participate, and receives utility u(g(θ, λ)) from the policy.
Government capacity (θ) is meant generally. It could be ‘extractive capacity,’ i.e.
ability to collect taxes, or ‘productive capacity,’ i.e. ability to provide public goods
and enforce contracts (?). A signal of either type of capacity triggers participation
because the citizen believes the government will be more likely to affect his future
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wellbeing — through tax collection or public goods provision — and thus he has an
incentive to try to influence public policy to be as favorable as possible.
Concretely, the government can provide public goods, which increase the citizen’s
utility, and extract taxes, which decrease the citizen’s utility. The citizen’s preferred
policy (high public goods, low taxes) results when the government is high capacity
and when the citizen participates. To simplify notation, call this policy g+. When
the government is low capacity, the government always provides the same policy
(low public goods, low taxes) regardless of citizen participation: g(L, 1) = g(L, 0).
In this case, the citizen has no incentive to participate. Call this policy g0. When
the government is high capacity and the citizen does not participate, however, the
policy is worse for the citizen than g0 because the government collects taxes without
providing public goods. Call this least-preferred (by the citizen) policy g−. To
summarize:
u(g+) ≥ u(g0) ≥ u(g−) (3)
Before the tax campaign, the citizen believes the government is high capacity
with probability p ∼ F (·). If he participates, his expected utility is:
EU1 = p(u(g
+)− c) + (1− p)(u(g0)− c) (4)
If he doesn’t participate, his expected utility is:
EU0 = p(u(g
−)) + (1− p)(u(g0)) (5)
The citizen chooses the action that maximizes expected utility. There is a thresh-
old point p∗ of indifference between participating and not participating:
p∗ =
c
u(g+)− u(g−)
(6)
In this expression, the quantity (u(g+) − u(g−)) is the participation dividend,
which we might term d. The derivative with respect to d is negative:
∂p∗
∂d
= − c
d2
< 0 (7)
Thus, as the participation dividend increases, citizens can be less confident that
the government is high capacity but still choose to participate.
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Now assume that the government launches a tax campaign, which sends a signal
about its capacity (θ). The citizen knows that a high-capacity government adminis-
ters a tax campaign with probability α, and a low-capacity government administers
a tax campaign with probability β. Then as long as α ≥ β, by Bayes’ Theorem,
the posterior probability (q) that the government is high capacity conditional on
administering a tax campaign is:
αp
αp+ β(1− p)
= q ≥ p (8)
Let F (·) be a uniform distribution, i.e. p ∼ U(0, 1), and α = 0.8 and β = 0.4. We
can then simulate the distribution of q, as shown in Figure A17. A threshold (p∗)
is shown at a value of 0.7. Individuals with values of p to the right of this threshold
participate; those to the left do not. There is more mass to the right of the threshold
in the posterior distribution, indicating that individuals with priors to the left of the
threshold have shifted in their beliefs to the right, choosing to participate only after
receiving the signal sent by the tax campaign. Thus, the tax campaign catalyzes
citizen engagement with the state by conveying information about the capacity of
the state.
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Simulations assuming a uniform distribution of prior beliefs, α = 0.8, and β= 0.4.
Figure A17: Simulated distributions of prior and posterior beliefs about govern-
ment capacity.
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The rest of this section contains tables and figures examining evidence for such an
updating mechanism in the context of the 2016 property tax campaign in Kananga.
• Table A15 explores whether there are differences in the beliefs about the gov-
ernment between the control group and different subsets of the treatment
group. The first column shows the main treatment effects in the full sample
(identical to Table V in the paper). The second column restricts the treatment
group to households that were registered by taxpayers only (while all control
households are included). The patterns of updating are broadly analogous.
If anything, removing unregistered households in treatment from the sample
increases the gap with the control group regarding the perceived responsibility
and extractive capacity. The third column then restricts the treatment group
to non-payers only — again validating that these forms of updating occur
among non-payers as well as payers. Finally, Column 4 restricts the treatment
group only to registered households who did not pay. Once more, the pattern
is largely the same. Of course, this analysis involves conditioning on outcomes,
so it should be interpreted as suggestive and correlational.
• Table A16 examines beliefs in the treatment group by comparing relevant
subgroups. The first column reproduces the overall treatment effect, while
the next three columns restrict to the treatment group only and correlate
beliefs among subgroups. Column 2 compares registered households and un-
registered households in treatment. Registered households view the govern-
ment as having higher extractive capacity. Column 3 then compares payers
and nonpayers, finding similarly that payers believe the government has more
extractive capacity (across all dimensions) and that tax collectors have more
integrity. Column 4 compares participators with non-participators. Partici-
pators are similar overall, but as noted in the paper, they are noticeably less
positive about the integrity of the government.
• Table A17 examines heterogeneous treatment effects by past exposure to the
formal state. I use baseline measures of past state exposure aggregated to the
neighborhood level: (1) past visits from government tax collectors, and (2) past
engagement in political protests. The former measure captures state activity in
the neighborhood, while the latter captures respondents’ exposure to the state
outside of the neighborhood. Consistent with an updating mechanism, the tax
campaign appears to have a larger effect on participation in neighborhoods
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with relatively less past exposure to the state, though the standard errors on
the interaction terms are too large to make this analysis anything more than
suggestive.
• Figure A18 plots the participation rate (Townhall or evaluation) in control
neighborhoods as a function of distance to the nearest treated neighborhood.
This does not reveal an increase in participation close to treatment neighbor-
hoods, consistent with spillover effects.
• Table A18 more formally explores spillover effects of the tax campaign, lever-
aging its cluster-level random assignment. There is evidence of spillovers in
collector visits, which is not surprising given that neighborhood borders were
often not clearly indicated on the ground. However, such spillovers in visits
did not appear to lead to a (detectable) spillover on tax payment in control
neighborhoods. There is also no statistically significant evidence of spillovers
on costly participation. I am powered to detect a spillover effect size of 0.002
when analyzing the Treated neighbors variable (a count of number of adja-
cent treated neighborhoods) and of 0.049 when analyzing the Treated borders
variable.
The interpretation of the first estimate is that an additional treated neigh-
bor would be associated with an increase in participation of 0.2 percentage
points. The interpretation of the second is that an additional kilometer of
border with a treated neighborhood would be associated with an increase in
participation of 4.9 percentage points. Although the second spillover estimate
may at first seem large, the fact that the units are kilometers changes that
interpretation.20 The median amount of shared border with a treatment neigh-
borhood is 0.75 kilometers, and the standard deviation is 0.47 kilometers. A
one-kilometer increase therefore represents a large increase, the equivalent of
more than two standard deviations. It is perhaps more informative, then, to
note that the spillover analysis can rule out a maximum effect size of 2.3 per-
centage points associated with a one standard-deviation increase in the length
of borders shared with treatment.
20The variable was initially measured in meters, but the magnitude was too small to read in a
table. So I rescaled the variable to make it legible.
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Table A15: Effects of the campaign on beliefs about the government: correlations
in different subgroups
Full Registered Nonpayers Registered and
sample only only nonpayers only
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: Responsibility of government
Resp. for public goods provision 0.117∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.058)
Panel II: Extractive capacity of government
Information about citizens 0.147∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.051)
Ability to punish evaders 0.046 0.093∗ 0.018 0.062
(0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.053)
Perceived citizen compliance 0.343∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.063) (0.048) (0.060)
Performance of tax ministry 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.068
(0.047) (0.051) (0.048) (0.053)
Panel III: Productive capacity of government
Ability to provide public goods -0.013 -0.071 -0.020 -0.096
(0.053) (0.059) (0.053) (0.061)
Performance of government 0.043 0.048 0.035 0.042
(0.049) (0.054) (0.050) (0.056)
Panel IV: Integrity of government
Integrity of tax collectors 0.187∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.049) (0.045) (0.051)
Integrity of government spending 0.109∗∗ 0.085 0.112∗∗ 0.087
(0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055)
Transparency of government 0.031 -0.003 0.019 -0.036
(0.045) (0.053) (0.046) (0.055)
Each cell summarizes a separate OLS regression. The first column shows the treatment effect from
estimating Equation 1 in the paper with the dependent variable indicated (cf. paper Table V).
The next columns restrict the treatment group to (i) only households that were registered by tax
collectors, (ii) only non-payers, and (ii) registered non-payers, respectively. Data: endline survey
merged with government tax database.
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Table A16: Correlations between citizens’ beliefs about the government and tax-
payer registration, payment, and participation
Full sample Treatment group only
Treatment Registered Payers Participators
Effect vs not vs not vs not
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel I: Responsibility of government
Resp. for public goods provision 0.117∗∗ 0.059 0.027 0.071
(0.051) (0.044) (0.064) (0.100)
Panel II: Extractive capacity of government
Information about citizens 0.147∗∗∗ 0.074 0.189∗∗∗ -0.093
(0.044) (0.048) (0.073) (0.095)
Ability to punish evaders 0.046 0.098∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.047) (0.047) (0.073) (0.098)
Perceived citizen compliance 0.343∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.725∗∗∗ -0.109
(0.053) (0.065) (0.119) (0.118)
Performance of tax ministry 0.122∗∗∗ 0.009 0.331∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.047) (0.050) (0.071) (0.107)
Panel III: Productive capacity of government
Ability to provide public goods -0.013 -0.086 0.082 -0.046
(0.053) (0.057) (0.103) (0.098)
Performance of government 0.043 0.035 0.055 -0.051
(0.049) (0.050) (0.081) (0.118)
Panel IV: Integrity of government
Integrity of tax collectors 0.187∗∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.463∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗
(0.044) (0.051) (0.084) (0.120)
Integrity of government spending 0.109∗∗ -0.046 -0.018 -0.161∗
(0.050) (0.052) (0.092) (0.083)
Transparency of government 0.031 -0.077 0.104∗ 0.170
(0.045) (0.051) (0.062) (0.122)
Each cell summarizes a separate OLS regression. The first column shows the treatment effect from estimating
Equation 1 in the paper with the dependent variable indicated. Columns 2-4 show, within the treatment
group only, the correlations between the indicated belief about the government with taxpayer registration,
tax payment, and participation, respectively. Data: endline survey merged with government tax database
and participation records.
47
Table A17: Heterogeneous effects of the campaign on participation by past expo-
sure to the formal state
Townhall or evaluation
(1) (2) (3)
Campaign 0.050∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.019)
Campaign X Past visits (high) -0.027
(0.033)
Past visits (high) 0.027
(0.025)
Campaign X Past protest (high) -0.055
(0.037)
Past protest (high) 0.033
(0.023)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.071 0.071 0.072
Observations 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.16 0.16 0.16
F -test p-value 0.0092 0.00094
The outcome is an indicator for attending a townhall or submitting an evaluation. Past visits
(high) indicates neighborhoods above the median level of past visits from government tax collectors
reported during baseline. Past protest (high) indicates neighborhoods above the median level of
past citizen participation in protests reported during baseline. See Section VI.B in the paper for
further details about these variables. Data: endline survey merged with participation records and
neighborhood-level measures from baseline survey.
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Figure A18: Participation (Townhall or evaluation) in control neighborhoods by
distance to treatment.
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Table A18: Spillover effects of the campaign on tax collector visits, compliance,
and participation
Visited Paid Townhall
by property or
collectors tax evaluation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Campaign 0.480∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
Treated neighbors 0.017∗ 0.006 0.001
(0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
Total neighbors -0.011 -0.009∗ -0.004
(0.010) (0.005) (0.007)
Treated borders 0.063∗∗ 0.005 0.016
(0.030) (0.015) (0.025)
Total borders -0.037 -0.008 -0.026
(0.031) (0.015) (0.023)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.260 0.261 0.086 0.084 0.071 0.071
Observations 2913 2913 2913 2913 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356 356 356 356 356
Control Mean 0.17 0.17 .00058 0.0058 0.16 0.16
Treated neighbors is a count of the number of adjacent treated neighborhoods. Total neighbors
is a count of the total number of adjacent neighborhoods. Treated borders is the total length (in
kilometers) of borders shared with treated neighborhoods. Total borders is the total length of
all neighborhood borders. Data: endline data merged with administrative data on tax payment,
participation records, and geographic measures on the neighborhood level.
A3.3.3 Bargaining
The third possible mechanism is bargaining, in which the tax campaign gave citizens
a bargaining chip they could use to demand better governance in exchange for future
tax compliance. This section contains several additional pieces of evidence regarding
this mechanism.
• Figure A19 summarizes the content of submitted evaluations. It shows that
submitted evaluations overwhelmingly demanded more participation, informa-
tion, public goods, and a location to report problems with public services.
• Table A19 replicates the treatment effects on submission of government evalu-
50
ations while restricting to evaluation forms that (i) demanded the government
do a better job, or (i) contained a written-in demand.
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Figure A19: Content of submitted evaluations.
Table A19: Effects of the campaign on submission of evaluations demanding better
governance or containing written-in demands or complaints
Evaluation demanding Evaluation with written-in
better governance demand / complaint
(1) (2)
Campaign 0.021∗∗ 0.020∗∗
(0.010) (0.008)
Covariates Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes
R2 0.049 0.038
Observations 2913 2913
Clusters 356 356
Control Mean 0.078 0.033
Evaluation demanding better governance is an indicator variable for individuals who sub-
mitted an evaluation demanding the government do a better job (rather than expressing
satisfaction). Evaluation with written-in demand / complaint is an indicator for respon-
dents who, in the optional comment section at the bottom of the evaluation form, wrote
demands of or complaints about the provincial government. Data: endline survey merged
with participation records.
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A3.3.4 Coordination
This section examines the plausibility of a coordination mechanism. The intuition
behind this mechanism is that a door-to-door tax campaign could increase participa-
tion by stimulating communication or shared grievances in treated neighborhoods
and thus lowering the costs of coordination. Coordination could have influenced
individuals’ participation decisions if citizens anticipated being more successful in
lobbying the government for public goods spending if more members of the neigh-
borhood attended townhall meetings or submitted evaluations making common de-
mands.21
At first glance, this explanation appears unlikely because there were no instances
of individuals from the same neighborhood standing up together at townhall meet-
ings to make an overtly joint demand. Also, the intracluster correlation of par-
ticipating in either the townhall or evaluation submission is relatively low (0.073),
and there are not obvious patterns in the spatial distribution of participators within
neighborhoods that would suggest a collective action mechanism (Figure A21).22
However, the campaign could have triggered coordination in more subtle ways.
More formal tests of this mechanism include: (1) examining if treated townhall
participants were more likely to arrive at meetings accompanied by other members
of the neighborhood; and (2) examining if participants’ houses were more clustered
geographically within treatment.
The first test is whether individuals in treatment neighborhoods were more likely
to travel together to townhall meetings. If the tax campaign lowers barriers to
coordination, then one might expect individuals to have shared a motorbike taxi
to the townhall meeting venue.23 They would then arrive together and appear
consecutively in participant log. Using data from this log, I define an indicator
for individuals who arrived before or after someone from the same neighborhood. I
21Coordination effects would likely be complements to updating about state capacity. Citizens
would not only anticipate greater individual-level benefits to participation after observing the
tax campaign; they would also be better able to coordinate with their neighbors to lobby the
government. That said, ? argue that, theoretically, updating and coordination could be comple-
mentary, substitutes, or independent mechanisms.
22For instance, if participants’ houses were more densely clustered in treatment neighborhoods,
this might suggest a coordination mechanism, as I explore formally below.
23As noted, many individuals in the sample lived far from the venue, such that a taxi ride could
cost as much as $2, the median household’s daily income (and the cost of the property tax).
Sharing motorbike taxis is very common in Kananga.
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then regress this variable on the treatment indicator using the sample of all townhall
participants.
The results are summarized in Table A20. Column 1 shows that the coefficient on
the treatment indicator is positive, but not statistically significant at conventional
levels.24 Column 2 controls for the total attendance rate in a neighborhood to
explore the possibility that joint arrivals are mechanically explained by the higher
number of attendees in treatment. Although the neighborhood attendance rate is
also an outcome of treatment, and therefore a “bad control” (?), it is nonetheless
suggestive that adding this regressor on the right-hand side only slightly depresses
the magnitude of the coefficient on the treatment indicator. Column 3 then further
controls for the average population density of the neighborhood, which could also
impact joint arrivals.25 Although the sample size is small, this analysis provides little
support for the view that townhall participants were coordinating on attending the
townhall meetings to a greater degree in treatment compared to control.
The second test of a coordination mechanism is to examine whether treated par-
ticipants’ houses were more clustered geographically within neighborhoods com-
pared to control. If individuals were making isolated, independent decisions about
whether or not to participate, then their houses would have been, on average, spread
out evenly throughout the neighborhood, due to the method of random sampling
used by enumerators.26 A stylized depiction appears in the first panel of Figure
A20. However, if a coordination mechanism explains the increase in participation
caused by the tax campaign, then we might expect individuals in the same vicinity
to have also been more likely to attend, such as those within the red circle in the
second panel. The third panel indicates a spatial distribution of participator house-
holds consistent with a coordination mechanism. The overall spatial distribution of
participating households in treatment and control appears in Figure A21.
24The sample size is small in this analysis, so I may well be underpowered to detect an effect even
of this non-trivial magnitude.
25Population density is estimated by dividing the estimated number of households by the total
area of the neighborhood.
26As noted on p. 10, enumerators followed a skip pattern throughout the whole neighborhood, so
respondents are typically spread out.
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Table A20: Effects of the campaign on arriving at a townhall meeting with member
of neighborhood
Arrived at townhall
meeting with neighbor
(1) (2) (3)
Campaign 0.041 0.036 0.029
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Neighborhood townhall attendance 0.334∗∗ 0.313∗
(0.163) (0.160)
Neighborhood population density -0.000∗
(0.000)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.102 0.120 0.133
Observations 379 379 379
Clusters 184 184 184
Control Mean .083 .083 .083
The outcome variable is an indicator for townhall participants who arrived immediately
before or after another individual from the same neighborhood. Neighborhood townhall
attendance is the average rate of townhall attendance in the neighborhood. Neighborhood
population density is the estimated total number of houses in a neighborhood divided by its
area. Data: endline survey merged with townhall attendance records. The sample includes
all individuals who attended a townhall meeting.
Figure A20: Stylized illustration of the spatial distribution of participant house-
holds in treatment and control neighborhoods.
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Figure A21: Locations of treatment and control individuals’ households who
attended a townhall meeting or submitted an evaluation.
An observable implication of this hypothesis is that the average distance among
the houses of participators within neighborhoods should be smaller in treatment
relative to control, conditional on the total number of participators per neighbor-
hood. To construct this measure, I first calculate the Euclidean distance between
each participant’s household within a neighborhood and then take the average of
these distances.27 I then regress this neighborhood-level measure on the treatment
indicator to test if the average distance among participating households is smaller
in treatment relative to control. As shown in Table A21, the point estimate on the
treatment indicator is not statistically distinguishable from zero. This remains true
if we condition on the neighborhood participation level — the number of households
participating could mechanically decrease the average distance28 — and the average
population density of the neighborhood. This analysis, therefore, does not provide
much support for a coordination mechanism.
27The analysis is thus on the neighborhood level, omitting neighborhoods with fewer than two
participants.
28This is, again, a “bad control,” but included for completeness.
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Table A21: Effects of the campaign on the average Euclidean distance among
participators’ households
Average distance among
participating households
(1) (2) (3)
Campaign -0.462 -1.096 -1.257
(1.748) (1.749) (1.702)
Neighborhood participation level 12.217∗∗∗ 11.739∗∗∗
(3.852) (3.888)
Neighborhood population density -0.003∗
(0.001)
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.265 0.273 0.276
Observations 482 482 482
Control Mean 14 14 14
The outcome variable is the neighborhood-level average Euclidean distance (measured in
degrees) among houses of all individuals who either attended a townhall or submitted an
evaluation. Neighborhood participation level is the average rate of participation (attending a
townhall or submitting an evaluation) in the neighborhood. Neighborhood population density
is the estimated total number of houses divided by the area of the neighborhood. Data
are from the endline survey, merged with participation records and geographic measures,
collapsed to the neighborhood level. The unit is the neighborhood. The sample includes all
neighborhoods with multiple individuals who participated.
In sum, there it little evidence that treated participants arrived together at town-
hall meetings or were more clustered geographically. It is thus unlikely that a coor-
dination mechanism explains the effect of the tax campaign on participation.
A4 Robustness checks
This section reports robustness checks for the main estimations in the paper, in-
cluding the following specifications (variants of Equation 1 in the paper):
1. No covariates: This specification includes only strata fixed effects.29
2. Basic covariates: This specification includes only gender, age, age squared
in Xijk and nothing in Xjk.
3. All covariates: This specification includes all covariates listed as possible
29In the pre-analysis plan, I planned always to include the ‘basic covariates’ below. But for
completeness, I have included a no-covariates specification in the robustness tables.
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covariates in the pre-analysis plan. On the individual level (i.e. in Xijk), these
include gender, age, age squared, years of education, log income, wealth, a
dummy for business owners, a dummy for government workers, and a dummy
for multiple plot owners. On the neighborhood level (i.e. in Xjk), these in-
clude baseline measures of average road quality, public lighting, wealth, past
reported visits from government tax collectors, past reported payment of taxes,
political participation, evaluation of the provincial government, trust in the
provincial government, views of government corruption, and views of the im-
portance of the provincial government in public goods provision. I also include
dummies indicating deciles of the time lag between the tax campaign and out-
come measurement.30
4. Enumerator fixed effects: This specification includes fixed effects for the
15 enumerators who administered the endline survey.
5. Sampling weights: This specification includes the sampling weights dis-
cussed in Section A2.2. The resulting estimates can be considered representa-
tive of all property owners in Kananga.
6. House quality heterogeneity: This specification examines heterogeneous
treatment effects of the tax campaign by wealth, as proxied by house quality.
This specification was mentioned in the pre-analysis plan as a way to shed
light on mechanisms. In particular, the signal about the government sent by
the tax campaign may be stronger among individuals with less prior contact
with the government. Baseline data reveal that less wealthy individuals are
a clearly defined subgroup with less past exposure to the state.31 Exploring
heterogeneity by this dimension complements the analysis of mechanisms in
Section VI of the paper. Moreover, it is of general interest to explore if prop-
erty tax collection is regressive in this context, and whether citizens’ political
responses vary by wealth. For simplicity, I examine heterogeneous treatment
30I pre-specified these dummies to control for potential impacts of information about the campaign
spreading over time.
31Specifically, individuals who are below the median in a household wealth index (constructed
using the observed quality of the roof, toilets, floor, access to electricity, and ownership of a
vehicle) are 4.5 percentage points less likely to report ever seeing government agents in their
neighborhood. They are 3.4 percentage points less likely to know the full name of the provincial
governor, and 10 percentage points less likely to know the name of the provincial tax ministry.
These magnitudes increase considerably among even less wealthy segments of the population
(e.g. the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution).
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effects by interacting the campaign indicator with a binary measure of wealth
(House quality) that equals 0 if a house is constructed with mud bricks (56%
of the sample) and 1 if a house is constructed with fired bricks, cement, or
any other modern material (44% of the sample). To be precise, I estimate the
following equation:
yijk = γ1I
Campaign
jk + γ2I
Campaign
jk ∗House qualityijk+ (9)
γ3House qualityijk + αk + XijkΓ + XjkΦ + εijk
In robustness Tables A22 and A23, the estimated treatment effect on house-
holds of below-median house quality (γ̂1) and the coefficient on the interaction
term (γ̂2) are reported in the fifth and sixth columns, respectively. The p-value
of an F -test of equivalence between the γ̂1 and γ̂2 parameters is reported in
the seventh column.
Finally, Table A24 shows Average Effect Size (AES) coefficients for all index
outcome variables examined in the paper, following ?.
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Table A22: Robustness checks for treatment effects on payment and participation
No Basic All Enumerator Sampling House quality
Covariates covariates covariates fixed effects weights heterogeneity
Dependent variable β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 γ̂1 γ̂2 F -test p-value
Panel I: Compliance
Property tax compliance 0.108 0.109 0.111 0.108 0.106 0.092 0.040 0.053
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.053)
Panel II: Participation
Townhall meeting attendance 0.036 0.044 0.052 0.054 0.041 0.053 -0.017 0.181
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.035) (0.181)
Evaluation form submission 0.020 0.021 0.028 0.025 0.027 0.032 -0.016 0.170
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.023) (0.170)
Townhall or evaluation 0.047 0.050 0.049 0.053 0.046 0.057 -0.016 0.110
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021) (0.029) (0.110)
Townhall and evaluation 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.032 0.030 0.037 -0.021 0.022
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.022)
Index (townhall & evaluation) 0.140 0.147 0.142 0.158 0.144 0.177 -0.069 0.031
(0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.044) (0.053) (0.074) (0.031)
Cost of participation (transport) 0.052 0.054 0.044 0.058 0.049 0.066 -0.033 0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027)
Cost of participation (transport & opp.) 0.073 0.075 0.062 0.082 0.070 0.087 -0.035 0.041
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.038) (0.041)
In Columns 1-5, each cell summarizes an estimation of Equation 1 in the paper for the indicated outcome variable. The top number is the estimated coefficient on
the treatment indicator (β̂1), and the bottom number is the cluster-robust standard error. Columns 6-8 summarize estimations of Equation 9, showing heterogeneous
treatment effects by house quality. Columns 6 and 7 provide estimates of γ̂1 and γ̂2, and Column 8 shows the p-value from an F -test of equivalence of these two
parameters. For more information about each of these robustness checks, see p. 56. All dependent variables are identical to those discussed in Section IV.B of the paper.
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Table A23: Robustness checks for treatment effects on beliefs about the government
No Basic All Enumerator Sampling House quality
Covariates covariates covariates fixed effects weights heterogeneity
Dependent variable β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 β̂1 γ̂1 γ̂2 F -test p-value
Panel I: Responsibility of government
Resp. for public goods provision 0.109 0.104 0.117 0.037 0.119 0.105 0.028 0.569
(0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.041) (0.051) (0.063) (0.086) (0.569)
Panel II: Extractive capacity of government
Information about taxpayers 0.119 0.127 0.139 0.093 0.131 0.107 0.088 0.878
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.039) (0.046) (0.059) (0.078) (0.878)
Ability to punish evaders 0.028 0.036 0.043 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.023 0.922
(0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.037) (0.049) (0.063) (0.085) (0.922)
Perceived citizen compliance 0.313 0.318 0.282 0.360 0.355 0.251 0.218 0.813
(0.056) (0.055) (0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.063) (0.095) (0.813)
Performance of tax ministry 0.151 0.149 0.152 0.076 0.136 0.100 0.049 0.708
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.042) (0.048) (0.062) (0.085) (0.708)
Panel III: Productive capacity of government
Ability to provide public goods 0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.032 -0.005 0.000 -0.029 0.845
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.040) (0.054) (0.069) (0.090) (0.845)
Performance of government 0.065 0.065 0.073 0.004 0.062 -0.022 0.140 0.258
(0.051) (0.051) (0.050) (0.040) (0.051) (0.066) (0.090) (0.258)
Panel IV: Integrity of government
Integrity of tax collectors 0.209 0.206 0.187 0.164 0.187 0.169 0.040 0.305
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.040) (0.045) (0.057) (0.081) (0.305)
Integrity of government 0.134 0.129 0.107 0.075 0.141 0.204 -0.204 0.002
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043) (0.050) (0.063) (0.081) (0.002)
Transparency of government 0.072 0.068 0.055 -0.007 0.045 0.058 -0.057 0.376
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.039) (0.047) (0.061) (0.080) (0.376)
In Columns 1-5, each cell summarizes an estimation of Equation 1 in the paper for the indicated outcome variable. The top number is the estimated coefficient
on the treatment indicator (β̂1), and the bottom number is the cluster-robust standard error. Columns 6-8 summarize estimations of Equation 9, showing
heterogeneous treatment effects by house quality. Columns 6 and 7 provide estimates of γ̂1 and γ̂2, and Column 8 shows the p-value from an F -test of equivalence
of these two parameters. For more information about each of these robustness checks, see p. 56. All dependent variables are identical to those discussed in
Section IV.B of the paper.
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Table A24: Robustness check for index variables: AES coefficients
Townhall Resp. for Information Ability Performance Ability Performance Transparency
& evaluation public goods about to punish of tax to provide of of
index provision taxpayers tax evaders ministry public goods government government
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Campaign 0.101∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.039 0.106∗∗∗ -0.009 0.035 0.025
(0.037) (0.028) (0.032) (0.040) (0.039) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stratum FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2913 2913 2910 2883 2791 2484 2795 2890
Clusters 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 356
Estimated AES coefficients for index variables examined in the paper. All estimates are from the basic specification shown throughout the paper. Details on the
estimation approach can be found in ?. Data: endline survey merged with participation records.
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A5 Exact text of survey questions and question-
specific results
This section provides the exact text of the questions used to construct all survey-
based variables considered in the paper.32 It also shows question-specific results (in
cases when I otherwise used indices).
A5.1 Variables considered in Section V.
A5.1.1 Survey question text
1. Resp. for public goods provision. This variable is a standardized index com-
posed of respondents’ answers to two sets of survey questions. In the first set,
the enumerator first read the prompt and then gave the respondent a lami-
nated list of all the possible providers.33 Then, the enumerator listed each of
the sectors below, asking which provider should be primarily responsible for
service provision in that sector.
• Prompt: ‘I am going to list some services/infrastructure many commu-
nities have. Tell me who you think should be primarily responsible for
providing each one in our community. This does not need to be the
current provider of these services/infrastructure.’
• Sectors: schools, water system/wells, health care, keeping people safe,
helping poor people, economic development, road maintenance.
• Possible providers: national government, provincial government, NGOs,
community organizations, religious groups/leaders, traditional leaders/chiefs,
international organizations, ‘everyone should take care of themselves’.
In the second set of variables, the enumerator read the prompt followed by
two points of view asking which the respondent agreed more with. Finally,
the enumerators asked if the respondent agreed strongly or just agreed with
the statement. Each variable is coded from 0 to 3, where 0 indicates the
respondent envisions the least responsibility for the provincial government,
and 3 indicates the most responsibility.
• Prompt: ‘Now, I’m going to read you several statements of opposing
viewpoints. Please tell me with which statement you most agree.’
• Sets of opposing viewpoints:
(a) ‘Some people say the provincial government should take more re-
sponsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for’ or ‘Other people
32Note that the main variables, such as payment and participation, are discussed in Section IV.B
in the paper.
33This first set is labeled the ‘sector questions’ in Table A8, while the second set is labeled ‘hypo-
theticals.’
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say that people should take more responsibility to provide for them-
selves.’
(b) ‘Foreign aid organizations should provide more services in the health
and education sectors in Congo’ or ‘Foreign aid organizations should
provide fewer services like health care and education; that is the
responsibility of the provincial government.’
(c) ‘Foreign aid is necessary for Congo to become peaceful and prosper-
ous’ or ‘Foreign aid is not necessary in Congo; only the government
can achieve peace and prosperity.’
2. Information about taxpayers. This standardized index is increasing in the
perception that the government possesses information about citizens. The
underlying survey questions are as follows, to which respondents answered
using a four-point scale: ‘Yes - I am completely sure, Yes - I am somewhat
sure, No - I am somewhat sure, No - I am completely sure.’
• Prompt: ‘Now I’d like to ask you how much information you think the
provincial government keeps about citizens in its archives.’
• Questions:
(a) ‘Do you think the provincial government knows the address of your
house?’
(b) ‘Do you think the provincial government knows which of your neigh-
bors did not pay the property tax in 2016?’
(c) ‘Do you think the provincial government knows what you do for a
living?’
(d) ‘Do you think the provincial government knows how much money
you make each month?’
3. Ability to punish evaders. This standardized index is increasing in the per-
ceived capacity of the government to punish citizens who evade payment of
the property tax. The underlying survey questions are as follows.
(a) ‘Now, imagine that next week a tax collector comes and visits one of
your neighbors. Imagine he absolutely refuses to pay. In this case, what
is the probability that the government will pursue and enforce sanctions?
Choose one of the following options: very likely, likely, unlikely, very
unlikely.’
(b) ‘Now imagine your neighbor pays a bribe instead of paying the tax. What
is the probability that the government will pursue and enforce sanctions?’
4. Perceived citizen compliance. This variable captures the share of other citizens
whom respondents perceive as having paid the property tax in 2016. The
exact question read as follows: ‘In your opinion, how many other people in
your quartier paid the property tax in 2016?’ [All/most/some/a few/none]
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5. Performance of tax ministry. This standardized index is increasing in citizens’
evaluation of and trust in the tax ministry. The underlying survey questions
are as follows.
(a) ‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all? The tax ministry.’
(b) ‘Overall, how would you rate the performance of the tax ministry in
Kananga?’ [Excellent, Very good, Good, Fair, Poor, Very poor, Terrible]
6. Ability to provide public goods. This standardized index is increasing in the
perceived capacity of the provincial government to provide public goods. The
underlying survey questions are as follows.
• Prompt: ‘To be successful with its projects, governments need both (1)
the desire to do them, and (2) the capacity to execute them. Let’s discuss
the capacity of the provincial government. Please tell me if you strongly
agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree or are neutral about the following
statements.’
• Questions:
(a) ‘If the provincial government of Kasaï Central wants to improve all
of the roads in Kananga, it will do this efficiently and without prob-
lems.’
(b) ‘If the provincial government of Kasaï Central wants to provide elec-
tricity to everyone in Kananga, it will do this efficiently and without
problems.’
(c) ‘If the provincial government of Kasaï Central wants to find and
imprison a criminal hiding somewhere in Kananga, it will do this
efficiently and without problems.’
7. Performance of government. This standardized index is increasing in citizens’
evaluation of and trust in the provincial government. The underlying survey
questions are as follows.
(a) ‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all? The provincial government.’
(b) ‘Overall, how would you rate the performance of the provincial govern-
ment in Kananga?’
8. Integrity of tax collectors. This standardized index is increasing in citizens’
confidence that tax collectors will deposit money to the state account. The
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underlying survey questions are as follows.
(a) ‘In general, think of what the tax collectors will do with the money they
collect during this 2016 property tax campaign. Imagine the tax collectors
collect $1000 thanks to the campaign. How much of this money will they
submit to the state account?’
(b) Note: the respondent then answers the question ‘How much of this money
will they put in their pockets?’ If the results do not sum to $1000, the
respondent answers again. Only the integer response to the first question
is used for this variable.
9. Integrity of government spending. This standardized index is increasing in
citizens’ confidence that the money received by the provincial government
will be spent prudently and not be wasted or stolen. The underlying survey
questions are as follows.
(a) ‘Now I would like to ask you what you think the provincial government
will do with the money it receives from this 2016 property tax campaign.
Imagine that the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central receives $1000
thanks to this campaign. How much of this money will be put to good
use, for example providing public goods?’
(b) Note: the respondent then answers the question ‘How much of this money
will go to diversion of funds and waste?’ If the results do not sum to
$1000, the respondent answers again. Only the response to the first
question is used for this variable.
10. Transparency of government. This standardized index is increasing in citizens’
perception of the transparency of the government. The underlying survey
questions are as follows.
• Prompt: ‘Please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor
disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements.’
(a) ‘The Provincial Government of Kasai Central frequently and effec-
tively informs the public about the laws and obligations of citizens.’
(b) ‘The Provincial Government of Kasai Central is sufficiently transpar-
ent and open about its spending and operations.’
11. Number of collectors. This count variable is the number of different collectors
that visited a household, reported in the endline survey in response to the
question: “How many different tax collectors were there who came to your
house?”
12. Number of collector visits. This count variable is the number of reported visits
in the endline survey in response to the question: “How many times did they
come to your house in total in 2016?”
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13. Collector time spent (log). This variable is the (logged) estimated number of
minutes that tax collectors spent at a house over the course of all of their visits.
It was recorded in the endline survey in response to the question: “About how
much time did they spend at your house in total?”
14. Observed tablet/printer. This indicator variable equals 1 if the household re-
ports in the endline survey that they saw collectors using table and/or printer.
The exact question text was: “Did you see a tablet or handheld printer being
used by the tax collectors?”
A5.2 Coefficient plots for individual questions used in indices
Responsibility	of	provincial	govt	(index)
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	schools
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	water
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	health
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	security
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	welfare
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	development
Provincial	govt	should	provide	-	roads
Provincial	govt	should	provide	more
Provincial	govt	should	replace	foreign	aid
Congo	shouldn't	need	foreign	aid
-.1 0 .1 .2
OLS	coefficient
EsHmates	from	OLS	regressions	in	basic	specificaHon.	SEs	clustered	by	polygon.	All	variables	standardized.
Figure A22: Coefficient plot of treatment effects for individual survey questions
in Resp. for public goods provision index about the responsibility of the provincial
government in the provision of public goods.
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Information about taxpayers (index)
Information about taxpayers (HH location)1
Information about taxpayers (compliance)1
Information about taxpayers (occupation)1
Information about taxpayers (income)1
Ability to punish evaders (index)
Ability to punish evaders2
Ability to punish bribers2
Perceived citizen compliance
Performance of tax ministry (index)
Approval of tax ministry3
Trust in tax ministry3
Ability to provide public goods (index)
Ability to pave all city roads4
Ability to electrify all city4
Ability to imprison criminal4
Performance of government (index)
Approval of provincial government5
Trust in provincial government5
Integrity of tax collectors
Integrity of government spending
Transparency of government (index)
Transparency about laws/obligations 6
Transparency about spending/programs 6
-.2 0 .2 .4
OLS coefficient
Estimates from OLS regressions in basic specification. SEs clustered by polygon. All variables standardized. Superscripts denote constituent questions of the
following indices: 1=Information about taxpayers, 2=Ability to punish evaders, 3=Performance of tax ministry, 4=Ability to provide public goods,
5=Performance of government, 6=Transparency of government
Figure A23: Coefficient plot of treatment effects for individual survey questions
concerning the capacity and integrity of the provincial government.
A5.3 Additional variables considered in Online Appendix
1. Role of citizens in politics. This standardized index is increasing in the view
that citizens and their representatives should play an active role in monitoring
the government. It is composed of the following questions, with responses on
a 4 point scale increasing in agreement with the first viewpoint.
(a) ‘Some people say that citizens should have an active role in monitoring the
actions of leaders and how the government spends its money’ or ‘Other
people say that citizens should have more respect for authority and trust
the government to spend its money in the best possible way.’
(b) ‘It is more important for citizens to have a voice and some influence in
politics, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly’ or ‘It is more
important to have a government that make decisions quickly, even if we
the citizens have no influence over what it does.’
(c) ‘Citizens and their representatives in the Assembly should ensure that
the Governor explains to it on a regular basis how his government spends
taxpayers’ money’ or ‘The Governor should be able to devote his full
attention to developing the country rather than wasting time justifying
his actions.’
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2. Interest in politics. This standardized index is increasing in respondents’ in-
terest in politics. It is composed of three sets of questions. The first two
variables concern self-reported consumption of political news. The next three
gauge interest in politics by respondents’ knowledge of basic facts about the
government and politics. The next three variables present the respondent with
a choice between receiving information about the state or about some non-state
actor. They are coded as 1 if the respondent chose the state information and
0 otherwise.
(a) Set 1: consumption of political news.
i. ‘How often do you listen to the radio about politics?’ [5=Multiple
times per day, 4=1-7 times per week, 3=1-4 times per month, 2=Less
than once per month, 1=Only once ever, 0= Never]
ii. ‘How often do you read articles on the internet about politics?’ [anal-
ogous response key]
(b) Set 2: knowledge of political facts.
i. ‘Do you know the name of the current governor of Kasaï Central?
If yes, what is it?’ [2=Knows full name, 1=Knows part of name,
0=Doesn’t know name]
ii. ‘Do you know how many deputies there are in Kasaï Central?’ [10=cor-
rect answer, 9=wrong by 1,..., 0=wrong by 10 or more]
iii. ‘Can you name the territories that make up Kasaï Central? If yes,
please name them.’ [5=knows all five, ...., 0=knows none]
(c) Set 3: choice of political information. Prompt: ‘Now I’d like to give you
some information. I will give you three sets of choices. For each, tell me
which piece of information you would like me to share with you.’
i. ‘The total spending of the state in Kasaï Central in 2016’ or ‘The
total spending of UNICEF in Kasaï Central in 2016.’
ii. ‘The percentage of the population that works for the state’ or ‘The
percentage of the population that is Catholic, Protestant, and Pen-
tecostal.’
iii. ‘The percentage of Kananga’s public lighting that currently func-
tions’ or ‘The percentage of Kananga’s residents who own a diesel
generator.’
3. Engagement with national politics. This standardized index is increasing in
respondents’ self-reported past and future participation in national politics.
It is composed of the following yes-or-no questions, which I combined into an
index (as described in footnote 52 in the paper).
(a) ‘Do you plan to vote in the next election?’
(b) ‘Have you ever been a member of a political party?’ and (if not current
member) ‘Would you consider joining a political party in 2017?’
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i. Responses: 0=never member and not considering, 1=past member
but not considering, 2=never member and considering, 3=past mem-
ber and considering, 4=current member.
(c) ‘Have you ever been in a political march?’ and ‘Would you consider being
in a political march in 2017?’
i. Responses: 0=never participant and not considering, 1=past par-
ticipant but not considering, 2=never participant and considering,
3=past participant and considering.
(d) ‘Have you ever participated in a political protest of any kind?’ and ‘Would
you consider participating in a political protest in 2017?’ [analogous
response key as for marches]
(e) ‘Have you ever attended political rallies?’ and ‘Would you consider par-
ticipating in a political rally in 2017?’ [analogous response key as for
marches]
4. Engagement with city chiefs. This standardized index is increasing in respon-
dents’ self-reported engagement with avenue chiefs. The index is composed of
the following questions.
(a) ‘Has someone from your household ever gone to your avenue chief to
discuss a problem affecting your neighborhood or to complain about the
provincial government?’ [1=Yes, 0=No]
(b) ‘In 2016, did someone from your house contribute to a public good project
in your neighborhood, for example improving a road or building a bridge?’
i. This question asks about Salongo, an informal labor tax organized
by the avenue chief. Participation in Salongo is the most frequent
form of engagement with avenue chiefs. [1=Yes, 0=No]
(c) ‘Do you know the name of your avenue chief? If so, please say the name.’
i. This question gauges revealed engagement with the avenue chief.
[1=Yes, 0=No]
5. Views of city chiefs. This standardized index is increasing in respondents’
evaluation of and trust in local city chiefs. It is composed of the following
questions.
(a) ‘To what extent does your avenue chief respond to the needs of the peo-
ple on your street?’ [Four point response scale increasing in perceived
responsiveness]
(b) ‘I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could
you tell me how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of
confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none
at all? Quartier and avenue chiefs.’ [Four point response scale increasing
in confidence/trust]
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6. Demand for formalization. This standardized index is increasing in respon-
dents’ reported recent efforts to obtain formal documents. It is composed of
the following questions.
(a) ‘In 2016, did you try to get an identity document like a birth certificate,
driver’s license, passport or voter’s card from the government?’ [1=Yes,
0=No]
(b) ‘In 2016, has someone from your household applied for a license to sell
goods in town?’ [1=Yes, 0=No]
(c) ‘Are you considering obtaining a land title in 2017?’ [1=Yes, 0=No]
(d) ‘Are you considering obtaining a business permit in 2017?’ [1=Yes, 0=No]
7. Current public goods provision. This standardized index is increasing in the
perceived level of current public goods provision by the provincial govern-
ment. It is constructed similarly to Resp. for public goods provision (sector
questions). The enumerator listed a series of sectors, and for each respondents
chose whether they thought the provincial government currently provided ‘a
lot,’ ‘a little,’ or ‘nothing’ in that sector.
(a) Prompt: ‘Now let’s talk about what services the provincial government
currently provides to the citizens of Kananga. In your opinion, what
level of public services does the Provincial Government of Kasaï Central
currently provide?’
(b) Sectors: schools, water system/wells, health care, keeping people safe,
helping poor people, economic development, road maintenance.
8. Trusts researchers. This variable is increasing in self-reported trust of foreign
research organizations. It is constructed like other trust questions already
noted. The enumerator prompt was as follows: ‘I am going to name a number
of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you
have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not
very much confidence or none at all? Foreign research organizations.’
9. Knows researchers. This variable indicates if the respondent was able to iden-
tify the employer of the enumerator at the end of the endline survey. The
enumerator prompt was as follows: ‘Do you remember who I work for? If yes,
please say who you think I work for.’
10. Past participant. This variable indicates participants who report having par-
ticipated in past activities with our research team (identifiable by referencing
props used in lab games from past studies). The enumerator prompt was as
follows: ‘Have you ever played any games with envelopes and tents with a
[research organization] enumerator in the past?’
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11. Expected spending from taxes. This variable measures the share of endline
survey respondents who said they thought property tax revenues were likely
to be spent across different sectors. The question was repeated regarding the
second most likely sector.
(a) Prompt: “Now, think of all the money from the 2016 property tax cam-
paign that the provincial government spends. In what sectors will it
spend this money? Choose the sector in which you think it will spend
the most money.”
(b) Sectors: Schools /education, water system/wells, health care, keeping
people safe, helping poor people, economic development, road mainte-
nance, administration, none - they will steal or waste the money, other.
12. Past visits (high). This dummy variable indicates neighborhoods with above-
median reported past visits from government tax collectors (measured at base-
line). I aggregated individual responses for the neighborhood, and then com-
puted this indicator based on all neighborhood-level rates. The baseline survey
question was as follows.
(a) ‘Has a government tax collector ever come to your neighborhood?’
13. Past protest (high). This dummy variable indicates neighborhoods with above-
median reported past protest participation (measured at baseline). It is con-
structed analogously to the previous variable. The baseline survey question
was as follows.
(a) ‘Have you ever participated in a political protest of any kind?’
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Role of citizens in politics (index)
Thinks citizens should actively monitor leaders1
Thinks citizens must have voice in politics1
Provincial assembly should monitor gov spending1
Interest in politics (index)
Consumption of political news by radio2
Consumption of political news by internet2
Knows name of governor2
Knows number of deputies2
Knows names of territories2
Chooses to learn about state spending2
Chooses to learn number of state employees2
Chooses to learn extent of public lighting2
Engagement with national politics (index)
Planning to vote in next election3
Participation in political marches3
Participation in a political party3
Participation in political protests3
Participation in political rallies3
-.1 0 .1 .2
OLS coefficient
Estimates from OLS regressions in basic specification. SEs clustered by polygon. All variables standardized. Superscripts denote constituent questions
of the following indices: 1=Role of citizens in politics, 2=Interest in politics, 3=Engagement with national politics.
Figure A24: Coefficient plot for individual survey questions in the Role of citizens
in politics, Interest in politics, and Engagement with national politics indices.
Engagement with city chiefs (index)
Consulted avenue chief about problem1
Contributed to local project (salongo)1
Knows name of avenue chief1
Views of city chiefs (index)
Perceived responsiveness of avenue chief2
Trust of quartier and avenue chiefs2
Demand for formalization (index)
Applied for identity document3
Applied for sales license3
Demand for business permit3
Demand for land title3
-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
OLS coefficient
Estimates from OLS regressions in basic specification. SEs clustered by polygon. All variables standardized. Superscripts denote constituent questions
of the following indices: 1=Engagement with city chiefs, 2=Views of city chiefs, 3=Demand for formalization.
Figure A25: Coefficient plot for individual survey questions concerning the En-
gagement with city chiefs, Views of chiefs, and Demand for formalization indices.
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A6 Data anomalies, noncompliance, and deviations
from pre-analysis plan
A6.1 Missing values in house quality data
Due to a survey programming glitch, there is missing data on house quality for 78
observations (2.7%) in the endline data. Fortunately, I observe several components of
the ultimate measure of wealth that is used in the analysis (floor quality, possessions,
electricity access), as well as several other strong predictors (weekly and monthly
income, amount of money spent on transport in past 7 days, amount of money
spent on airtime in past 7 days). It is therefore possible to impute wealth measures
following the following steps.
1. Within a neighborhood of three adjacent neighborhoods, estimate the rela-
tionship (using OLS) between the missing dependent variable and each of the
other related variables.
2. Predict wealth for the 78 missing observations using the coefficients from the
previous regression.
In the main analysis, the full sample is used, including these imputed values for
the wealth variable. However, the results are robust to dropping these observations
in estimations that use the wealth variable.
A6.2 Non-compliance among collectors
One tax collector conducted one day of the property register in a control neighbor-
hood (neighborhood 421) instead of a different treatment neighborhood in the same
area. He also collected taxes from two households. This neighborhood was located
in Nganza commune, which was ultimately excluded from the analysis because the
conflict in Kananga made it too dangerous to conduct the endline survey there. As
such, this non-compliance does not affect the analysis considered in the paper.
Although tax collectors were randomly assigned to neighborhoods, at times no
tax collectors were able to work during the assigned week. Collector absences were
typically due to illness, trips outside of Kananga, or other work (such as petty
commerce, which many did on the side). In some extreme cases, the tax ministry
non-randomly re-assigned other available collectors to these neighborhoods. This
non-random reassignment occurred for 5.5% of treated neighborhoods. The com-
plete list is as follows.
1. Collector 1 re-assigned to neighborhood 111.
2. Collector 18 re-assigned to neighborhoods 579, 212, 558.
3. Collector 31 re-assigned to neighborhoods 368, 639.
4. Collector 7 re-assigned to neighborhood 419.
5. Collector 15 re-assigned to neighborhood 703.
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6. Collector 37 re-assigned to neighborhood 676.
7. Collector 17 re-assigned to neighborhoods 539, 675.
8. Collector 19 re-assigned to neighborhood 668.
9. Collector 22 re-assigned to neighborhood 671.
10. Collector 4 re-assigned to neighborhood 242.
A6.3 Deviations from pre-analysis plan
The number of total neighborhoods (356) in the final analysis is less than that antic-
ipated in the pre-analysis plan (431). As described on p. 8, all 71 neighborhoods of
the commune of Nganza were dropped before endline enumeration due to insecurity.
In addition, four neighborhoods in downtown Kananga were dropped because they
contained only non-residential properties (shops, government buildings, churches,
etc) and thus survey enumeration could not occur. As noted in Table II, the num-
ber of neighborhoods dropped for these reasons is balanced across treatment and
control.
In the paper, I focus on the principal reduced-form equation mentioned in the
PAP (Equation 1). In the PAP, I also included two more complex specifications to
capture the effect of bribes on participation. These specifications were motivated
by the concern that the tax campaign would increase bribes, which would create
another channel through which treatment could influence outcomes (i.e. essentially
an exclusion restriction concern). However, because I observe very low levels of
bribery and no treatment effect on bribes, I rely instead on the simpler specifications
noted in the analysis plan: Equations 1 and 2 rather than also Equations 3 and 4.
The IV analysis is similarly simplified, including only two endogenous regressors
rather than also including bribes as an endogenous regressor as in Equation 5 in
the PAP. Otherwise, the analysis in the paper is analogous to that described in
the PAP. In particular, the PAP makes clear that the primary objective of the
anticorruption interventions (audit, information) is to study bribery in a separate
paper. The document is also clear that the principal focus is how the tax campaign
affects participation and beliefs about the provincial government.
Additionally, I had initially planned to examine two other outcomes that I was not
ultimately able to collect. First, enumerators would offer respondents a chance to
sign their name to a petition being run by a local civil society organization expressing
disapproval of the provincial government, which would eventually be transferred to
the governor. However, given concerns about the non-anonymity of respondents,
the IRB prevented any researcher involvement with this petition. Second, I had
planned to send questions to respondents via SMS and measure who responded.
However, during piloting, I found that bulk SMS messages reached only about 40%
of the intended recipients due to the low rates of cell phone ownership and use in
the context. As a result, I never implemented this measurement strategy.
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Although not strictly speaking a deviation from the analysis plan, it is worth
noting that the hypotheses concerning the set of households from the baseline survey
whom the enumerators were able to track at endline are examined in a separate paper
(?). This paper explores the determinants of tax compliance in detail, exploiting
baseline characteristics to do so. Relatedly, questions about the duty of citizens to
pay taxes and the analysis noted in Section 4.4 of the PAP are discussed in ?.
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